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1. Background and Introduction 
Integrated water resources management (IWRM) and organizing it primarily at the river basin 
level are two of the most common and widely repeated recommendations in the water resources 
literature of the last decade if not longer (Allee 1988; Galloway 1997; McDonald and Kay 1988; 
World Bank 1993).  Basin management, which was previously assumed to be best undertaken 
through centralized arrangements, has come to be associated with the concept of 
decentralization, of managing water resources at the “lowest appropriate level.” (See, e.g., 
International Conference on Water and the Environment 1992; Mody 2001.)  Several conceptual 
arguments have been presented in favor of decentralization in water resources management, and 
basin-level management in particular, including that the entire array of resources and use patterns 
in the basin will be taken into account, management decisions will be based on better knowledge 
of local conditions, and public participation will be greater and broader.  
Empirical studies of river basin management systems provide opportunities to examine 
the claims made for basin-level water resources management, and to explore factors that 
influence its implementation and outcomes.  In this research project those factors and their 
relationships to river basin management have been explored in two ways: with a survey of river 
basin organizations throughout the world, and with case studies of eight river basins analyzed in 
greater detail.  Some of those eight cases have long histories of basin-scale institutions for water 
resource management, such as the Guadalquivir river basin in Spain and the Murray-Darling 
river basin in Australia.  Others were established more recently, as in the Brantas basin of 
Indonesia, where a river basin corporation, the Brantas River Basin Public Corporation, the 
subject of this study, was established in 1990. 
Indonesia shares the problems and issues of many developing countries pursuing a path 
of rapid economic growth. While Indonesia is rich in resources and has plentiful water supply at 
the outset, on a number of islands of the archipelago water resources have come under increasing 
pressure in recent years and are facing deterioration in quality and quantity due to the socio-
economic forces causing this deterioration.  Indonesia is among many developing countries to 
face water shortage due to degrading water quality (United Nations 1997). Industrialized 
countries have faced such water resource issues as pollution, eutrophication, toxicity 
development, ecosystem dysfunction and acidification over a long period of time and in 
sequence.  Indonesia, like other developing countries, is facing these problems simultaneously, 
and has recognized the need to develop a program to manage water resources at the river basin 
level to address water quality and scarcity issues in the next 25 years.   
The Brantas River Basin area of East Java is an economically developed region of 
Indonesia of great national interest.  Central government line agencies have been involved with 
water infrastructure development in the Brantas basin for over three decades for purposes of 
flood control and regularization of supply for irrigation, industry, and power generation. The 
establishment of the Brantas River Basin Management Corporation, or Perum Jasa Tirta I (PJT 
I), in 1990 placed emphasis on the management aspects of water resources at the river basin 
level, rather than primarily on water and infrastructure development.    6
An examination of institutions for river basin management within the Brantas basin is of 
great value to the larger global comparative study. It illustrates the prospects and challenges of 
creating and embedding arrangements for integrated water resources management in a 
developing country undergoing rapid economic, political, and institutional change. Much can be 
learned from the process and outcomes to date of Indonesia’s historically centralized central 
government’s efforts to introduce river basin management, as well as its recent efforts to 
proactively adapt its basin management institutions to comprehensive political, administrative, 
and fiscal decentralization reform of its public administration system. 
This framework comprises developing and supporting river basin management as an 
important component of advancing the integrated management of water resources in the Brantas 
basin through a multi-tier framework of institutions which were originally partly managed 
directly by the center and partly by deconcentration of national government powers and now are 
being decentralized with water resources management regulatory powers vested in the East Java 
provincial and district governments.  This framework includes: (a) PJT I as a public revenue-
generating corporation with a concession to serve as a bulk supplier of water from the Brantas 
River and its larger tributaries and, as a management and maintenance organization for major 
publicly-owned infrastructure in these rivers; (b) the East Java provincial government’s Basin 
Water Resources Management Units (Balai PSDA) for management of water resources and river 
infrastructure O&M in the basin’s lesser rivers; (c) irrigation management within irrigation 
schemes by units of the provincial and district governments; (d) regulation of water allocation 
and water quality through provincial and district government water resources and environmental 
units; (e) development and rehabilitation of major infrastructure by a centrally funded 
construction organization (Proyek Brantas); (f) a Basin Water Resources Management 
Committee (PPTPA) with stakeholder government units and PJT I membership that will become 
a Brantas Basin Water Resources Council (with non-government stakeholder membership) for 
inter-agency coordination, recommendations to the Government of East Java of basin 
management policy (to be followed by PJT I and the various Balai PSDA in the basin) and 
resolution of issues; and (g) a Provincial Water Resources Management Implementation 
Committee (PTPA) that sets provincial policy and resolves broad issues
2.  Whereas PJT I is 
represented on both the PPTPA and PTPA, its activities (and those of the Balai PSDA) are 
governed, regulated and coordinated by the provincial government agencies (such as the 
Provincial Public Works Agency or Dinas PUP, Provincial Environmental Agency or 
BAPEDALDA, etc.) and are subject to government as well as non-government stakeholder 
views. 
                                                 
2   The PTPA will become a Provincial Water Resources Council with non-government stakeholder 
representation upon issuing of a new Provincial Regulation to implement the 2004 Water Resources Law.   7
2. Analytical Framework 
To analyze the data gathered for this project from the case studies and from the survey of river 
basin organizations, a framework has been developed that identifies a number of political and 
institutional factors which may be associated with the emergence, sustainability, and success or 
failure of decentralized approaches to integrated water resource management at the basin scale.  
These factors and their hypothesized relationships with basin management in a country that has 
decentralized or is attempting to decentralize water resource management institutions are derived 
from the institutional analysis literature relating to water or other natural resource management 
and to decentralized systems (especially Ostrom 1990, 1992; also Agrawal 2000; Alaerts 1999; 
Blomquist and Schlager 1999; Bromley 1999; Easter and Hearne 1993; Wunsch 1991). 
For brevity, we present these political and institutional factors in an outline fashion, 
gathered under four headings.  Our information gathering and analysis focus on the following 
sets of variables: 
• Contextual factors and initial conditions 
• Characteristics of the decentralization process 
• Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities 
• The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements. 
  Variables considered within each set are listed in the appendix .  The Brantas basin case 
is discussed in terms of these categories and variables in Section 7 below. 
3. Methodology 
A case study approach for this project was chosen in order to examine closely the processes of 
institutional change as well as the current situation of water resources management in the basin.   
The site visit was facilitated by an expert and active participant in water policy and management 
affairs in the Brantas basin and within Indonesia and interviews with basin authority officials and 
other basin stakeholders were held during a week-long visit. A consultant with extensive 
experience observing the institutional developments within Indonesia and the Brantas River 
Basin prepared a background paper on the basin prior to the visit.  The semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with a focus on understanding the processes of institutional change 
and the performance of water management institutions at sub-basin, basin, and national scales, 
matters that were closely within the knowledge of the interviewees.  The semi-structured nature 
of the research allowed for flexible and consistent investigation of issues as they emerged.   
The following analysis of the Brantas basin case is therefore based on a combination of 
sources—documentary materials on Indonesia and the Brantas basin, the background paper 
prepared for the visit, and the interviews conducted during the site visit.  The findings and 
conclusions therefore do not represent the point of view of a single individual or organization, 
but emerge from a composite of data collected and reviewed by the research project team.   8
4. Brantas Basin Water Management Issues 
4.1 Physical Characteristics of the Brantas Basin 
The Brantas river basin is located within the province of East Java in Indonesia (see Figure 1). It 
has an area of approximately 11,800 km
2 and makes up 24.6% of East Java’s land area. The 
basin is bounded by Mt. Bromo (2,393m) and Mt. Semeru (3,676m) on the east, a series of low 
ridges to the south, Mt. Wilis (2,169m) and its ridges on the west, and the Kedung low ridges and 
the Madura Strait on the north. The Brantas River is 320 km long, with its headwaters located in 
the Arjuno volcanic massif, a substantial topographic feature in the southeast portion of the 
basin.  (Ramu 2004 ) The river flows around the massif clockwise, through the Malang Plateau, 
then west through the major dam and reservoir complex, made up of Sengguruh, Sutami/Lahor, 
Wlingi, and Lodoyo.  At the southwestern portion of the basin, where the Ngrowo River joins it, 
the Brantas turns north towards the agricultural plains region, and then east through the delta 
regulated by the New Lengkong Barrage.  This structure divides the Brantas into the Porong and 
Surabaya Rivers and the Porong and Mangetan Canals.  The canals provide irrigation water for 
the paddy-growing region before discharging into the Madura Strait. The Porong River serves as 
flood diversion canal during the rainy season, and the Surabaya River is a primary source of raw 
water for Surabaya City.   The channel slopes of the upper Brantas basin are relatively steep 
(greater than .005), becoming more gradual lower in the system (.001 or less).  (IFPRI 2002)  
There are two active volcanoes within the basin. Mt. Semuru erupts frequently with most 
of its debris depositing outside of the basin.  The eruptions of Mt. Kelud, on an average cycle of 
15 years, have had great effect upon river morphology and have led to considerable loss of 
human life and property damage. Its erupted material amounts to about 200 million m
3. This 
volcanic ash has been a primary contributor to soil fertility for the basin, as well as to riverbed 
aggravation and reservoir sedimentation.   
The tropical monsoon climate of the basin comprises the rainy season from November to 
April and the dry season from May to October.  The annual mean temperature in the basin ranges 
from 24.2 to 26.6 degrees Celsius.  Rainfall averages 2,000 mm, with over 80% occurring in the 
rainy season.  Average rainfall in higher elevations is between 3,000 and 4,000 mm. Variation of 
rainfall from year to year is large: in wet years, rainfall averages 2,960 while in dry years (which 
occur once every three years on average) it averages 1,370 mm. The yearly relative humidity 
within the basin ranges from 75% to 82%.  
The average surface water potential in the Brantas basin is estimated to be approximately 
12 billion m3, with the average flow at an estimated 3 billion m3, or 25% of available surface 
water. The average annual flow is 823 m
3/s in the upstream reaches, 3,859 m
3/s in the midstream, 
and 5,300 m
3/s in the downstream area.  Groundwater exists mainly in the regencies of Madura, 
Surabaya, and Madiun.  In the basin, 447 deep wells irrigate 25,730 ha. There are 38 deep wells 
for raw water, supplying large municipalities with a significant portion of their supply. Rural 
water supply is mainly from nearly 27,600 shallow wells. (Ramu 2004)    9
4.2 Population and Economic Development.   
The Brantas basin is considered a strategic basin of Indonesia and East Java. Comprising 24.6% 
of East Java’s land area, it has 23% of the province’s forest land and 55.8% of its arable land 
(see Table 1). (Ramu 2004) Most arable land in the basin is used for productive farming (38%), 
while the remainder is used for forest, settlement, and non-agricultural activities.  (Rusfandi 
2000) The agricultural economy centers on paddy cultivation, nearly all of which is irrigated 
(Table 2).  In 2000, the Brantas basin made up 32% of East Java’s total rice production and 5% 
of that of Indonesia.  Aside from rice, important food and cash crops include maize, cassava, 
soybean, peanuts, tobacco, coffee, and sugarcane. 
 
Table 1:  Land Use Data (hectare) 
Location Forest  Plantation
Agricultural 
Land 
Homestead Others Total 
East Java  1,346,500  859,600 1,157,100 564,960 864,038  4,792,198
Brantas Basin  309,400  31,400 645,800 170,100 23,300  1,180,000
Source:  Land Use Plan, East Java. 
 
Table 2: Production of Major Crops (1000 metric tons) 
Location  1970 1980 1990 2000 
Rice      
Indonesia  26.39 29.77 45.18 51.90 
East  Java  4.66 6.28 8.23 9.22 
Brantas  Basin  1.43 2.29 2.43 2.99 
Maize      
Indonesia  2.60 4.01 6.73 9.68 
East  Java  1.05 1.69 2.58 3.49 
Brantas  Basin  0.03 0.40 0.49 1.12 
Cassava      
Indonesia  10.69 13.53 15.83 16.09 
East  Java  3.33 4.03 3.71 3.62 
Brantas  Basin  0.09 1.03 0.86 0.95 
Source:  Statistical Year Book-2001, Central Bureau of Statistics.   10
The basin’s population, which amounts to nearly fifteen million, has increased by 53.4% 
over the past 30 years and represents 42.4% of East Java’s population (2000) with a density of 
1,249 (Table 3).  In 2001, the population of municipalities accounted for 25.3% of the total 
population  in the Brantas River basin, while that for East Java Province was 10.7%. This is due 
to the presence of the two important industrial cities of Surabaya and Malang in the basin, which 
have grown to 2.5 million and 743,0000020inhabitants, respectively.  With these major cities, the 
GDP for the basin has increased 225 fold in Rupiah terms over the past 30 years and in 2000 
contributed 56% to East Java’s GDP.  In that year, industrial production in the basin – a 
significant 77% of East Java’s entire industrial production – was of the order of RP 7.724 trillion 
(~ US$ 858 million). The trend of GDP in East Java and the Brantas Basin is shown in Figure 2.   
It should be noted that though industrial employment has grown from a mere 30,000 in 
1970 to 959,300 in 2000, the bulk of basin residents still work in the agricultural sector with 
small- to medium-sized land holdings. Irrigators comprised 76% of surface water diversions in 
the Brantas in 2000, while industrial and domestic uses diverted 9% and 14%, respectively. (PJT 
I 2000 data). 
 











Indonesia 1,920,000 207,600,000 108
Java 132,000 121,293,000 919
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Surabaya City  300 2,445,000 8,150
Source:  Central Bureau of Statistics, Indonesia  
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4.3 Water Resource Issues and Problems  
From the above it becomes clear that the basin comprises a diversity of water users, ranging from 
millions of urban domestic users to industries and farmers, all depending on reliable access to 
sufficient amounts of safe water. The basin, with its dynamic socio-economic development is 
expected to continue contributing to East Java’s and Indonesia’s growth, thus its formal and legal 
designation as “nationally strategic” by the central government
3. This important feature will be 
explored further below since it has had a major impact on the institutional and organizational 
options  and that implemented with regard to the management of the basin.  
At the same time as the Brantas basin’s importance for East Java cannot be overstated, 
the intense industrialization, agricultural development, and population growth within the basin 
over the past three decades combined with its climate and physical features have contributed to 
several critical water resources problems, including pollution, floods, and seasonal water 
scarcity. While large investments have been made, including critical infrastructure as well as 
institutional investments for improved water resources management, problems to be resolved are 
still significant.  
The most serious problem currently stems from untreated effluents from industry, 
domestic users, agriculture, and livestock breeding draining into the Brantas River.  Pollution 
loads are primarily from domestic and industrial sources.  Rapid urban growth and the lack of 
resources to address sanitation, sewage, and solid waste have resulted in increase of pollution in 
urban areas. On average, 65% of Brantas basin inhabitants are served by public, shared, or 
private sanitary facilities. Though this percentage is higher in urban areas – 70-80% - a 
corresponding 20-30% are not served. (Ramu 2004)  Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) in the 
Surabaya River along Surabaya city is about 10 to 20 mg/L.  The BOD in the Brantas River 
along Malang city is 8 to 15 mg/L.  (Rusfandi 2000) These amounts exceed the assimilative 
capacity of the rivers during the dry season.  Industries are required by law to treat effluents, but 
regulatory institutions are very weak and lack resources to monitor and enforce regulations.  The 
emphasis on economic development and support of export-related industries has been a 
disincentive in enforcing regulations on pollution control.  Agricultural waste pollution is not as 
significant a factor given that agricultural activity mainly takes place during the rainy season 
when the flow of water is sufficient to flush out pollutants.  However, agricultural pollution 
accumulating in reservoirs and rivers during the dry season from irrigation return flows is 
mobilized during the wet season in some reaches of the basin.   In most reservoirs, nutrient 
                                                 
3    Under the former water law on Water Resources Development (No. 11 of 1974) and its Government 
Regulations (PP No. 22 of 1982))--based on deconcentrated public administration--and, the new Water Resources 
Law (No. 7 of 2004)--based on administrative and fiscal decentralization--GoI may assume control of basins defined 
in this manner (there are about 15  such basins).  Thus, after 1999, even though the GoEJ is wholly responsible for 
the Brantas Basin’s water resources, GoI may own and operate a management organization in its territory whose 
ownership, financing and tasks are centrally determined and management authority and responsibility as before 
(prior to January 2000).  Under the Clarification section of Article 13(3) of Law No. 7, a “nationally strategic basin” 
is defined on the basis of basin characteristics such as: (i) size and volume of the water resources potential; (ii) 
quantity of sectors and population; (iii) social, environmental and economic impacts of national development; and 
(iv) negative impacts arising out of water’s `damaging power’ (i.e. social & economic impact of floods and erosion 
or sedimentation)   12
depletion is causing eutrophication.  Total pollution load in the basin has increased almost 
threefold in the last ten years.  
The Brantas basin experiences flooding in its lower reaches due to flat slopes and 
encroachment of flood plains in rural and urban areas as well as sedimentation.  Flood control 
infrastructure has been constructed to provide protection for return periods of 10 to 25 years. 
Nearly 60,000 ha. of  land used to be flooded annually prior to flood control implementation. 
Erosion/sedimentation from varying sources threatens the basin’s water resources by 
raising its potential for flooding.  A prominent source is the volcanic activity of Mt. Semeru and 
Mt. Kelud, which results in large quantities of volcanic ash. Hot lava causes immediate 
destruction, while soft molten rock embedded in mountain slopes readily disintegrates and flows 
down with rain, raising the riverbed of the mainstream and tributaries over time. Mt. Kelud 
erupts every 15 years on the average, resulting in high sediment yields in the middle reaches of 
the Brantas River, adversely affecting the Wlingi and Lodoyo reservoirs. Mt. Semeru’s 
continuous deposits affect the Sengguru and Sutami reservoirs. The sediment depositions have 
decreased river discharge capacity for carrying high flows, requiring intervention measures to 
prevent yearly floods.  In addition, a growing contributing source for erosion/sedimentation is 
wide-scale deforestation in the upper reaches of the basin to expand agricultural land use. This 
has subjected an estimated 18% of total Brantas lands in upper reaches to erosion, with 
detrimental impacts, inter alia, on reservoir infrastructure, water storage and power generation.  
The rainy season provides an abundant water supply for the river basin but water 
availability during the dry season is often barely sufficient to meet existing demand when 
instream water quality objectives are taken into account.  In the high-consumption region below 
New Lengkong Barrage, including the delta irrigation system, the Greater Surabaya municipal 
area and a high concentration of industries are particularly affected. Sugarcane factories’ 
operations, which make up 33% of industrial water demand, take place in the dry season, leading 
to diversion of irrigation supplies to meet industrial demand during low-flow years, which 
contributes to crop losses.   
5. Brantas Basin Management and Basin Stakeholders 
5.1 Public Administration Structure of Indonesia and East Java 
a.  Deconcentrated Government Prior to the year 2000 
b.  Administrative and Fiscal Decentralization 
c.  Sector Reforms and a New Water Resources Law 
5.2 Management in the Brantas Basin 
Due to its strategic importance, the Brantas basin has been subject to the central government’s 
attention for decades. In 1961, the “Brantas Riverbasin Development Project” was created, 
which focused on infrastructure solutions to the water resource management challenges 
encountered in the basin. The Brantas Project continues to exist, is still managed by the central 
government and  focuses on infrastructure development and rehabilitation  and  fully funded and 
implemented by the central government.   13
Given the devastating prominence of flooding in the basin, flood prevention was given 
first priority in the initial stage of the Brantas River Basin’s development.  The basic concept for 
the Brantas River Basin Flood Control Plan (Master Plan I) was “one river, one plan, one 
coordinated management.” The basin’s first master plan was prepared in 1961 using Japanese 
post-war reparation funds and consisted of large technical developments – dam structures, flood 
diversions, retarding basins, and riverbed channels.  At that time, the Ministry of Public Works 
(MPW) established and oversaw the Brantas Project to carry out these efforts. Table 4 presents a 
brief timeline of Brantas basin management. 
The table clearly illustrates the emphasis on infrastructure development during the first 
three decades of the Brantas Project’s existence. Only in 1990, when it had become fully 
acknowledged that the sustainability of these investments was not achieved by the Brantas 
Project itself – due to lacking incentives for maintenance - a different approach was sought, 
leading to the establishment of the Perum Jasa Tirta I (PJT 1)
4, a national state-owned company 
for river basin management, independent from the Brantas project. The early 1990s ushered in a 
new era of water resources management not only in the Brantas basin, but in Indonesia. 
At the national level, Indonesia’s second long-term 25-year development plan (PJPII: 
1994-2019) emphasizes integrated development and management of water resources, with a 
greater focus upon the operation and maintenance of infrastructure.  This new plan illustrates the 
shift in mindset of Indonesia’s administrators from a single-purpose focus to a multi-sector river 
basin approach to promote integrated water resource management. It was decided that authority 
and responsibility for irrigation management, which had been the primary focus in the previous 
long-term plan, was to be transferred gradually to the district and provincial levels as part of 
Government policy to increase regional autonomy, while the allocation of water among irrigation 
and other uses would make up a core function of basin management (Ramu 1999). Indonesia 
began to set up national policies towards organizing institutions and integrating management 
functions on the basis of hydrological boundaries and not on administrative boundaries. 
Integrated basin-level management was implemented early on in the Brantas basin. The 
Brantas Project had been responsible for planning for Master Plans I, II and III. However, in 
accordance with Ministry Regulation 56/1991, which delineates the preparation of river basin 
master plans as a PJT I task, PJT I was involved in generating Master Plan IV with the 
consultation of local government and users.  Planning is now recognized by the central 
government to be part of PJT I’s management function. Once the plan is accepted by the Central 
Government, PJT I can set up its long-term action plan to implement it.  Master Plan IV 
emphasized conservation and basin water resource management – institutional approaches for 
proper water governance.  PJT I also completed a long-term (1999-2020) plan with assistance 
from JICA, and are in the process of finalizing it for government approval.   
                                                 
4   A `Perum’ is a corporation with both revenue generating activities that must be self supporting , as well as 
managing  non-revenue generating public welfare tasks (such as flood control) that are wholly supported by 
government.  Thus assets such as multi-purpose dams and flood control levees are not included in the corporate 
balance sheet, i.e. a return on these assets is not required. This is in contrast to a `Peresero’ such as PLN (the 
Electricity Corporation) that fully owns all its revenue-generating assets, all of which are included in its balance 
sheet and for which there needs to be a satisfactory financial rate of return.   14
There are a number of agencies that are involved fully or partially, directly or indirectly 
in water resource related functions in the basin.  The 1998 study prepared by JICA lists 35 
organizations that have a role in water resources development and management in the basin.  It 
also lists the tasks and duties of these organizations.  The institutional framework for Brantas 
Basin management is presented in Figure 3, indicating the national, provincial and district level 
institutions that have primary or significant roles and responsibilities in the planning, 
development, operation, management or regulatory aspects of basin WRM.  The roles of the 
primary institutions are presented in Box 1.   15
Table 4:  Master Plans & Organizational Developments in the Brantas River Basin 
Year National  Level  Event  Brantas Basin Level 
Event 
Description 
1945  Indonesia’s Independence     
  Master Plan I  Emphasized flood control by constructing dams 
in the upper reaches and river improvement to 
increase capacity. 
1961 
 Establishment  of 
Brantas River Basin 
Development Project 
Plans and constructs infrastructure for basin 
under authority of Ministry of Public Works. 
1969-1998  General Suharto’s New 
Order Government in 
power 
  Water resources and other governmental 
functions consolidated to center. 
1969-1994  First twenty-five-year 
development plan, termed 
(PJPI)  
 Water  resources  policy emphasized rice 
production self sufficiency.   
1973    Master Plan II  Emphasized irrigation development to support 
government policy on rice self-sufficiency. 
1974  Water Law No. 11     
1985    Master Plan III  Emphasized water supply for domestic and 
industrial users to support the government policy 
on industrialization and urban development. 
1990    Establishment of Perum 
Jasa Tirta I 
Public company established in the Brantas basin 
for O&M of infrastructure and water operation in 
the Brantas river and its major tributaries 
1994-2019  Second twenty-five year 
development plan (PJPII)  
  Emphasizes IWRM and O&M of infrastructure.   
1998    Master Plan IV  Emphasizes institutional approaches to address 
conservation, management of basin water 
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Figure 3: Institutional Framework for Brantas Basin Management Box 1: Water Resources Management Institutions and Roles in the Brantas Basin 
 
 
5.3 The Brantas Basin Management Corporation (Perum Jasa Tirta I) 
The Brantas Basin Management Corporation (PJT I) was established by governmental 
regulation in 1990 as a state corporation to operate and maintain major water resources 
infrastructure in the basin and to manage its water resources.  Due to the basin’s 
relatively high level of economic development, it can achieve a reasonably high level of 
O&M cost recovery from water users: hence the logic of corporatizing the WRM 
function with respect to bulk water supply and allocation.  
Macro and Program Planning & 
Budgeting 
:  National, Provincial and District Planning Boards 
(Bappenas / Prov. Bappeda / Dist. Bappeda) 
     
Management/Technical Supervision 
& Guidance 
:  Ministry of Public Works  its agencies (MPW , 
DGWR, Directorates) 
     
Development  :  National or Provincial Projects (Proyek Brantas) 
     
Regulatory  :  MPW , MoF, MoSE; Provincial Water Resources 
Service and Basin Water Resources Management Unit  
(Dinas PUP, Balai PSDAs); District WR or Public 
Works Service 
     
Water Resources Management 
Implementation (including major 
infrastructure O&M for 40 rivers) 
:  Brantas River Basin Corporation (PJT-I) established 
through Government Regulation No.5 of 1990 later 
replaced by Government Regulation No.93 of 1999. 
     
Irrigation Management  :  a)  District Water Resource Agency (Kab. Dinas PU) 
for Irrigation Systems within a district  
     
    b)  Provincial Basin Water Resource Agency (Balai 
PSDA) for irrigation systems that are inter-district. 
    c)   Provincial and District Irrigation Commission 
Coordination  :  a)  Ministerial Coordination Team (Tim Kordinasi) at 
the national level which is expected to be replaced 
by a National Water Council with stakeholder 
representation in  2005. 
     
    b)  Provincial Water Resources Committee (PTPA) at 
the provincial level, which is expected to be 
replaced by a Provincial Water Council with 
stakeholder representation in 2005. 
     
    c)  District Water Resources Council (KTPA) to be 
setup in 2005 with stakeholder representation. 
     
    d)  Basin Water Resources Committee (PPTPA) at the 
SWS level which is expected to be reorganized 
with stakeholder representation in 2005. 




This approach to outsource the water resources and infrastructure management 
functions to a freestanding company is rather unique, not only in Indonesia (where one 
other such public corporation – PJT II has been established to manage the water resources 
of the Citarum Basin in West Java), but worldwide.
5  PJT I manages water supply 
allocation, water quality, flood control, river environmental management, and water 
resource infrastructure for 40 rivers, constituting the majority of significant water 
resources in the basin. The remaining secondary, tertiary, quaternary rivers are 
maintained by the province through Balai PSDA if they cross districts (kabupaten) and by 
the District (Kabupaten) dinas if they are within the district boundary. Brantas PJT I 
serves as a bulk water supplier and allocator to the irrigation systems served by the basin 
rivers under its mandate; the rest are served by the Balai PSDA or the district dinas.  It is  
responsible for operating, maintaining, and managing the dams, hydraulic works and, 
flood control infrastructure and the flood warning system for rivers under its mandate.  It 
also takes care of dam safety assurance for reservoirs under its management.  The Brantas 
Corporation also participates in the management of catchments albeit in a small way and 
in promoting water based tourism. 
Financial Structure and Funding of PJT I 
As a state-owned company PJT I is supposed to turn in a set profit to the Central 
Government and accordingly seeks to fund itself through water supply fees from industry 
and for supply to the hydropower units within its dams, as well as municipal water 
suppliers. As in many other countries, farmers are exempt from payment for irrigation 
water deliveries although they constitute the largest water user group and consume most 
of the Brantas Basin’s developed water supplies. 
PJT I must pay a dividend to the Ministry of  Finance, and according to 
information provided during the field visits, this profit should increase each year by Rp. 7 
billion (~ US$778,000).  PJT I prepares a program and budget regarding their profit for 
the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of State Enterprises.  Upon closer review, the 
company is currently able to cover around 30% of actually needed O&M of infrastructure 
under PJT I management from its resources, after the pre-established “profit” has been 
paid to the central government. According to information received from officials, this 
needs-based O&M expenditure used to be higher – around 60% - but with Indonesia’s 
economic crisis in the past years, revenue collection has been more difficult. In this 
context it is important to point out that PJT I is subsidized by the central government 
because the salaries of its staff – many of whom were originally hired from the Brantas 
Project – continue to be paid from national rather than PJT I funds. Thus, the budgetary 
arrangements between PJT I and central Government are not simple, but at the same time 
it is clear that the quoted figure of 30% available for O&M needs to be seen in the light 
of the need for additional funding subsidies  for PJT I’s public goods activities which are 
outside its commercial operational mandate. This relationship also indicates the 
continued dependence of management in the Brantas basin on national funds.  
                                                 
5 The Water Resources Management Company (COGERH) of Ceará State in Brazil has been established in 
a similar manner and with similar objectives and is also included in this case study series. Globally, 
however, this approach is often recommended in order to increase the focus on and incentives for the 




PJT I Management Structure 
For the technical aspects of river basin management, PJT I solicits guidance of the 
Ministry of Public Works  (MPW ), which supervises PJT I’s management and functions. 
The provincial Water Resources Services Office (Dinas PUP) serves as a regulator for 
PJT I. District-level government provides support for operational matters, providing 
enabling conditions at the local level for PJT I.  The Ministry of Finance sets tariffs for 
hydropower users.  The Governor, who serves as the President’s representative in the 
region, sets tariffs for municipal and industrial users, and the Minister ultimately 
proposes the rate by regulation, further signifying the Central Government’s continued 
influence on fiscal aspects of basin management.  Thus PJT I has no control over the 
tariff of its bulk water supply services and its revenue is controlled by water rates fixed 
by political-economic and not cost-plus considerations. Further, irrigation bulk water 
supply derives no revenue. This explains, inter alia, why PJT I cannot meet its full O&M 
costs. 
Management of Brantas PJT I is through a Supervisory Board with a President 
Director assisted by three directors.  Its structure indicates ministerial authority over its 
affairs, which is typical of Indonesian state corporations.  The President Director and 
Director are appointed by the President on the recommendation of MPW. The 
Supervisory Board, which is answerable to the Minister of Finance and MPW, carries out 
the general supervision of the corporation, including implementation of its work plan and 
annual budget.  Every three years, two to five members are chosen to sit on the board 
from MPW, Ministry of Finance and agencies whose activities are related to the 
corporation. The Supervisory Board is appointed by the President on a proposal from 
MPW, cleared by MOF.  The Governor of East Java also sits on the Board. The power of 
the Supervisory Board as stipulated in the regulation ensures a degree of management 
autonomy to the basin agency.  Nonetheless, it is apparent that given the Supervisory 
Board’s structure and the fact that PJT I’s infrastructure O&M costs are subsidized by 
MPW, MPW wields considerable influence over its operation and, it can earn income 
from Directors’ fees, etc. 
In summary, both from the financial and overall decision making perspective 
there is a clear and continued relationship and dependence by the corporation on the 
national, and to a lesser extent, on the provincial government.  
5.4 Major Stakeholders in the Brantas River Basin 
Box 2 describes the stakeholders of the Brantas river basin.   
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Box 2: Major Stakeholders of the Brantas River Basin 
Principal Water Users 
1.1.1.1.1  Irrigation 
Irrigated agriculture, the largest water consumer in the Brantas river basin, consumes about 20% of annual discharge of 
the river  and over 70-80% of utilized water abstractions therefrom.  Of the 907,000 ha of irrigated land in East Java, 
42.6% is within the Brantas basin.  The amount of water diverted for irrigation varies from 2,298 mcm to 2,448 mcm 
per year.  There has been a dramatic transformation from low-intensity agriculture to high-intensity agriculture within 
the basin. Cropping intensity increased from around 0.8 in 1960 to 2.2 by 2000, while the area cultivated increased 
from 247,000ha to the current 387,100 due to improvements in rice variety, increased agricultural inputs, and reliable 
water supply in the dry season (through regulation of the reservoirs built in the basin by the national government). 
Water user associations (WUAs) manage water distribution and the O&M aspects within tertiary blocks (50-150 ha in 
size). For many larger irrigation schemes, WUAs have been organized into WUA Federations (WUAFs).  Since 2000, 
responsibility for O&M of entire irrigation systems has devolved from the province to the regency-level irrigation 
agencies.  If there are schemes that cross regency boundaries, WUA representatives attend the Balai PSDA meeting. 
Changes are underway to include representatives of WUA federations in basin level decision-making (PPTPA). 
1.1.1.1.2  Domestic Water Supply 
Water is provided for domestic purposes by fourteen regional water supply state-owned enterprises (PDAM), which 
supply treated drinking water to urban areas.  PDAMs are managed as public corporations under the authority of the 
district Government.  East Java Water Resources Services Agency (Dinas PUP) is responsible for issuing a license for 
raw water abstraction, while PJT I is responsible for delivery according to the licensed water allocation. In 1960, the 
domestic raw water supply was around 73 mcm.  In 2002, the total volume taken from the Brantas basin for domestic 
purposes was around 243 mcm. PDAMs are represented directly on the Basin Water Resources Committee and have a 
close working relationship with PJT I. 
1.1.1.1.3  Industry 
Industrial development in the basin has increased considerably due to reliable water supplies for industrial use and port 
access in Surabaya.  Industrial production has increased from Rp. 41.9 billion (US$4.7 million) in 1970 to 7,723 billion 
(US$858 million) in 2000, accounting for 77% of East Java’s industrial production.  Industrial water demand in 1970 
was around 50 mcm and in 2000 it was 129 mcm. In 2002, around 141 mcm of industrial water was supplied from the 
Brantas to over 120 registered industries.  Industrial water supply is regulated by licenses issued by the Provincial 
Dinas PUP on the recommendation of the PJT I, who are responsible for implementing water delivery.  The Ministry of 
Industry represents industry interests in the PTPA. 
1.1.1.1.4  Hydroelectric power producers 
Hydropower capacity within the basin has increased from 31 mw (170 million kwh/year) in 1970 to around 240.2 mw 
(1200 million kwh/year) in 2000.  Hydropower plants are owned and operated by the National Power Corporation 
(PLN), while the PJT I operates the dams and provides the water for hydropower production.  Given the coordination 
requirements between the infrastructure of PLNs and PJT I supplies, both have a close working relationship. PLN, a 
state-owned profit-generating corporation (i.e. a Peresero), participates directly in the PTPA. 
1.1.1.1.5  Brackish water fish ponds 
Brackish water fishponds for fish and shrimp cultivation are located mainly in the coastal areas of the Delta.  
Freshwater for fishponds is taken from drainage canals in the irrigation area.  The existing total area of brackish water 
fisheries in East Java was approximately 60,000 ha in 1997, out of which 54,000 ha was under the extensive method of 
cultivation and only 6,000 ha was under intensive cultivation (introduced in 1985).  Brackish water fishery area in the 
Brantas Delta is approximately 15,730 ha, based on the extensive method of cultivation.  Water demand is estimated to 
be about 1.29m
3/s, which is supplied from irrigation drainage water. 
 
Water Resources Regulators 
The Ministry of Public Works  (MPW ),  manages the fifteen strategic and/or  trans-provincial river basins and provides 
Governor provides the licenses under MPW  oversight in these  basins. Though local governments have responsibility 
for management and regulation of irrigation networks and structures within provincial jurisdiction, MPW is charged 
with planning for irrigation water supply to meet regional needs on the basis of the Governor’s proposal.  MPW is 
required to coordinate affected parties to address social impacts that arise from reservoir construction. MPW also 
decides the method for flood risk assessment, flood disaster management, management of flood areas, and guidance on 
the precautions for flood prevention either before, during, or after the flood.  The Governor of East Java then is 




East Java Water Resources Services Agency (Dinas PUP) has primary responsibility on water resources development 
and management at the provincial level.  The Agency provides the Provincial Governor with technical assistance in 
water resources management policy, infrastructure development, operation and management of irrigation facilities, 
issues abstraction permits and related activities, with focus on activities that transcend Kabupaten/Kotamadya (district) 
boundaries.   
 
Other Ministries of the Central Government have a key regulatory role in the Brantas basin: 
•  The Ministry of Finance provides fiscal oversight of basin management for strategic basins.  
•  The Ministry of Mining and Energy is responsible for the administration of groundwater resources.  
•  The Ministry of Forestry has regulatory responsibility for issues concerning deforestation; and 
•  The State Ministry of Environment has a regulatory responsibility in matters of pollution control and water 
quality management.  
Nevertheless, these responsibilities are devolved to the provincial government and its various sector dinas. 
 
Water Resources Operators 
1.1.1.1.6  PJT I 
PJT I’s activities are financed through fees from industry and hydropower sectors and municipal water suppliers.  PJT 
I’s mandate is to manage water quantity, water quality, conservation, and maintenance of water resources 
infrastructure. PJT I provides bulk water supply for irrigation systems, raw water for municipal and industrial use, 
water supply for hydropower plants, manages sand mining services, develops and operates tourism facilities on land 
and reservoirs under its control in its working area, and carries out consulting services.   
Regional Offices of Water Resources Management (Balai PSDA) 
Balai PSDA were established in all of the river basin territory (SWS) within the East Java PWRS in 1998 as part of GoI 
efforts to decentralize water resources management to operate, maintain and manage the infrastructure and the water 
resources in the rivers that are not under the jurisdiction of PJT I.  These rivers include the 2
nd, 3
rd and 4
th order rivers 
in the Brantas basin without major infrastructure or major water benefits with the exception of irrigation. There are 3 
(three) Balai PSDAs in the Brantas river basin. Decentralization policies maintain that irrigation systems within district 
jurisdictions are managed by districts, so Balai PSDA manage the inter-district irrigation system and serve as the field 
regulatory arm of the Dinas PUP. All major infrastructure in the Brantas basin is managed by the PJT I, so the Balai 
PSDA manage the smaller size irrigation infrastructure.  These agencies are the lowest level provincial agency for 
advice and implementation of regulatory decisions (abstraction licensing, effluent discharge licensing, flood plain use, 
etc.). 
 
Irrigation Water User Associations (WUA) 
Irrigation water users were empowered to make decisions concerning operations at the irrigation system level through 
Government Regulation (PP) No. 77/2001 on Irrigation.  In accordance with this regulation, district level administrators 
(Regents or Mayors) are required to establish District Irrigation Commissions to oversee allocation and distribution of 
irrigation water for agricultural and other users at the district level.  It is the Provincial and District Government’s 
responsibility to develop WUAs.  Since 2001, East Java has implemented the Irrigation Management and Transfer 
program (IMT) on a pilot basis. Through IMT, management and associated decision-making is transferred to 
Federations of WUA (WUAF).  The WUAF have in some cases taken on small maintenance works. The objective of 
the IMT program is for decentralization of irrigation management in order to involve farmer organizations as partners 
with district level water agencies regarding investment, O&M, and management decisions.  This also helps increase 
farmers’ contributions towards O&M costs of irrigation systems. However, the new Water Resources Law is 
interpreted as not allowing delegation of irrigation management responsibility to WUAFs outside tertiary blocks and 
PP 77/01 is under revision. (Note: As a consequence of issue of the new Water Law #7/2004 the IMT program will be 
replaced by a Participatory Approach Program or PPP through revision of PP #77/2001).  
 
Source: Ramu 2004  
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6. Findings Concerning Performance of Basin Management in the Brantas Case 
The performance of the PJT I in achieving its objectives is best evaluated by considering 
the overall policy objectives involved in its development and implementation, as well as 
the most critical issues of the basin.  Based on the Ministry of Public Works Regulation 
No. 56/PRT/1991, Article 6, the main tasks of the PJT I include: 
•  Performing operation and maintenance of water resources infrastructure;  
•  Water supply services;  
•  Management of the river basin, including water resources conservation, 
development, and utilization; and  
•  Rehabilitation of water resources infrastructure.    
Brantas PJT I’s activities have evolved with the subsequent decrees.  Its 
management tasks are: 
•  Preparation of water allocation and drought allocation plans for Provincial 
Irrigation Committee (PIC) [or Provincial Irrigation Commission in future] 
approval and bulk water allocation based on the agreed plan and user licenses; 
•  Planning and operating the flood control and the flood warning systems; 
•  Provision of technical recommendation for water licensing; and 
•  Undertaking water quality monitoring, provision of technical recommendations 
for wastewater discharge and participation in the Clean River Program (Prokasih). 
The tasks of PJT I concerning operation and maintenance include development 
and implementation of programs concerning: 
•  General maintenance and some less expensive rehabilitation of infrastructure; 
•  Sediment removal and monitoring in critical areas; 
•  Providing technical recommendations;  
•  Monitoring sediment mining in rivers; and 
•  Preparing land use plans, providing technical recommendation for licensing of      
river corridor utilization, and monitoring river corridors. 
These activities are indicative of the shift that has taken place in Indonesia since 
the mid-1990s from emphasizing flood control to strengthening institutional aspects 
(hydrology, flood fighting, flood warning, flood management, etc.). The Ministry of     
Public Works  has recognized the importance of O&M, river channel improvement, and a 
strong basin-wide organization to manage floods and allocate water resources on a near 
real time basis. . PJT I has achieved results in implementing a reasonably good system of 
water allocation and management and a reliable flood forecasting system, as well as 
maintaining major infrastructure in fairly good condition. Managing water quality, 
catchment conditions, and the river environment, however, are the responsibility of many 
entities, and there is need for greater coordination and authority to address these issues.  
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6.1 Flood Management 
The regional government (Province/District) is ultimately responsible for flood 
management and addressing flood damage, but PJT I plays a primary role, having 
responsibility for O&M of flood protection infrastructure and for the Flood Forecasting 
and Warning System (FFWS).  It coordinates activities of all relevant agencies and the 
governor, providing information concerning water levels.  The FFWS at PJT I’s main 
office is used to prevent or mitigate damage and to ensure public safety. Field data are 
transferred to the master station every 30 minutes.  Flood defense teams perform flood-
fighting activities. Information concerning river conditions and damage at every stage of 
a flood is disseminated to people living near the river. Agreements exist between the 
province and the districts regarding how to manage floodwaters. According to 
interviewees, damage due to floods has decreased significantly in the Brantas basin since 
their establishment. Thus, while floods remain to be a challenge in the basin, not least due 
to new threats such as indiscriminate forest logging in the upper watersheds (dealt with 
under a different ministry), flood management has improved and can be seen as one of 
the achievements of the past decade’s emphasis on institutional change in the basin. 
6.2 Water Quality 
For water pollution control, final responsibility lies with the governor in accordance with 
Government Regulation (PP) 20/1990 on Water Pollution Control.  Provincial Regulation 
5/2000, in the interest of the decentralizing authority, makes it possible for the Governor 
to delegate responsibility to the head of the Provincial Environmental Pollution Control 
Office (Bapedalda).  This agency coordinates all other agencies dealing with water 
pollution control. The Provincial Public Works Service is responsible for domestic and 
municipal wastewater and installation of sanitation facilities and Provincial Industry 
Service is considered responsible for industrial pollution control. Meanwhile, Law 
22/1999 further devolves authority to District governments and urban municipalities to 
deal with their industrial polluters and to handle sewerage and wastewater treatment.  At 
the basin level, as part of the water sector reform, Government Regulation (PP) No. 
82/2001 superseded PP 20/1990 and places management of urban and municipal water 
pollution under provincial, district and municipal purview.  This PP also allows the levy 
of effluent discharge fees.  The Ministry of Agriculture is to be involved in non-point 
source pollution from agricultural sources but formally, its regulation is under KLH. 
Regardless of all these new developments, it is ultimately expected that the 
governor or regent, according to their authority, will take action for a polluter to be 
prosecuted.  The problem of accountability for steps up to that point is very unclear. 
Provincial authorities hold municipal government responsible for not having commitment 
or capacity to address the issue of urban and industrial pollution, while municipalities and 
other stakeholders consider the governor too inaccessible to call upon to address it. There 
is also a problem of weak penalties for those industries that are prosecuted, which does 
not make polluting prohibitive.   
When asked how they might envision the possibility of tackling industrial 
pollution, PJT I staff would like to see the polluter-pays-principle as an instrument to 
encourage industries to limit their level of pollution to that agreed to in their license.  
Monitoring, charging a fee for pollution, and having a strong pollution law would all help  
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to improve treatment facilities and to give industries incentive for treatment.  There is a 
legal basis for water pollution fees in Government Regulation No. 6/1981 (and also PP 
82/01), which stipulates that a contribution to fund water resources infrastructure O&M 
can be collected as a payment from those industries whose activities have polluted water 
bodies within PJT I’s jurisdiction. The national government is currently trying to set up 
further enabling legislation for regional and local government wastewater disposal 
licensing and fee collection for all river basins. Hopefully this will be piloted in the 
Brantas basin with PJT I playing a major operational role through an operational 
concession from the Provincial Environmental and Pollution Control Office. In this 
context it is important to note that the water supply companies, which would usually have 
a major incentive to improve wastewater treatment, are only responsible for water supply. 
Thus, their incentives, like those of every other stakeholder, lie in hoping for the province 
to undertake needed investments and to enforce regulations.  
Sedimentation and Catchment Management 
To contend with sedimentation problems that originate largely from the basin’s active 
volcanoes, PJT I regularly dredges the middle part of the basin.  In the lower part of the 
basin, they operate a gate to control the water level and flushing.  In the upstream area, 
they participate in national reforestation programs.  However, rapid deforestation  due to 
timber harvesting and  uncontrolled agricultural development as well as  forest 
encroachment in the upper reaches continues to cause serious erosion, which has become 
more intensified with expansion in the upper reaches since the economic crisis.  Much of 
it has not employed terracing and appropriate agricultural erosion control practices, 
exacerbating sedimentation problems in the rivers during the rainy season. The Ministry 
of Forestry is ultimately responsible for handling deforestation issues in forest areas 
under its control while the Ministry of Agriculture has a soil conservation/extension role 
outside these areas. However the Ministry of Forestry’s jurisdictional reach is considered 
by interviewees to be limited since decentralization of responsibility to the Districts. 
Government regulation grants different levels of government the right to issue different 
forestry concessions: the central government issues large concessions, the province issues 
intermediate-sized concessions, and local government issues small concessions. As such, 
there is little incentive for local government to manage forest resources well. (World 
Bank 2003) Conservation efforts upstream have not been successful since they involve 
small plots under local government jurisdiction that have no catchment-wide impact.   
O&M of Infrastructure 
Generally, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of “soft” non-structural water 
resources management functions, while planning, financing, and construction of technical 
projects have direct and visible outcomes.  In a context where many development 
priorities are faced at once under conditions of financial constraint, housing the 
construction of large infrastructure projects and O&M responsibilities within the same 
agency tends to lead to expenditure bias against O&M.  The PJT I was developed to 
address this issue of bureaucratic supply failure regarding O&M of infrastructure.  PJT I 
has been responsible for operating, maintaining, and managing designated water 
resources infrastructure on behalf of the Government, which owns the infrastructure.  In 
the circumscribed role of planning operations, undertaking day-to-day operation, 
maintaining records, carrying out minor maintenance, addressing conflicts and taking  
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responsibility for all operational management, PJT I is successful.  They also plan and 
implement rehabilitation activities that are necessary for operational purposes and that are 
within their financial limits to conduct. PJT I has autonomy in day-to-day operational 
affairs, but is dependent upon a financing subsidy that is not completely within their 
control as it is set through a political process. Since it does not collect sufficient funds to 
cover O&M costs, it relies upon the Central Government to cover flood control costs, 
irrigation bulk water supply costs and major structure rehabilitation as a social welfare 
activity.  Additionally, though PJT I rehabilitates infrastructure where it can afford to, it 
relies heavily upon the Central Government to carry out larger rehabilitation efforts 
through the Brantas Project to rehabilitate gradually deteriorating infrastructure.   
It is worth noting, however, that despite PJT I’s financial shortcomings to cover 
costs, the structure of user charges as reflecting multiple use interests provides a strong 
base for eventual full cost recovery.  Different sectors pay different amounts established 
through a political process in which the PTPA (a provincial water resource coordinating 
body) has an important role. Industrial, hydropower, and municipal supply users seem to 
understand that their fees reflect a willingness to pay for PJT I services to lower 
production costs, and they have an appreciation for maintaining PJT I services.  
6.3 The “Brantas Spirit” 
PJT I has proactively developed strong informal working relationships with many of its 
stakeholders in order to effectively coordinate activities among Central-level ministries, 
Provincial-level agencies,  District-level governments,  local water users and concerned 
public and NGO organizations to carry out its duties. As a champion for river basin 
management, it has embodied the notion of the “Brantas Spirit,” taking the initiative to 
conduct public outreach and public relations activities to educate different sectors about 
the value of integrated water resources management. PJT I staff and management display 
clear pride in working for the company and in doing a good job. 
Within the Brantas basin, PJT I works with a number of local NGOs and 
institutions towards public awareness objectives. For instance, the NGO Raditya Lestani, 
operating out of the University of Education in Malang, trains teachers for 68 high 
schools located within 30 km of the Brantas river in an environmental education 
curriculum for their students based in chemistry, biology, geography, and economics. 
Students prepare a water quality inventory and learn about the river’s ecology.  PJT I 
supplies biological testing equipment and also works with the University of Brawijaya in 
Malang on environmental awareness issues for the students.  Every two years they host a 
river trip. The coordinators of these programs believe that education about water resource 
issues changes behavior not only of the students but also the students family. 
In light of the limitations in financial and policy making autonomy and overall 
authority, PJT I is considered to be successful by stakeholders because it is committed to 
upholding a professional and neutral profile, which gives it significant legitimacy among 
water users who seek unbiased information, expertise, and mediation assistance. PJT I 
focuses upon being a reliable and accessible service provider for tasks it has most 
authority over to invoke legitimacy: water allocation and supply and flood control.  The 
insulation from policy making activities works in its favor because it places PJT I 
squarely in the business of operating and maintaining the basin infrastructure. Water  
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users evaluate it as such, understanding that PJT I is not to blame for issues that they have 
limited authority and resources to address. 
6.4 Coordination and Stakeholder Involvement 
PJT I undertakes significant day-to-day coordination in order to carry out its operations, 
however this has its limitations.  The lack of general coordination among regulators, 
providers, and users at basin, provincial, and central government levels challenges the 
larger achievement of IWRM objectives. Much of this is exacerbated by the lack of 
proper representation by non-governmental stakeholders in decision-making fora, such as 
the provincial and basin water management committees by  water users (e.g. farmers) 
,private and public sector industry representatives and   also NGOs.  This is certainly a 
heritage born out of the decades of authoritarian government structures. As it currently 
stands, national, provincial, and basin-level coordinating committees are largely 
consisting of governmental agencies serving on behalf of stakeholders.  Moreover, the 
lack of a uniform national-level water resources policy has not been in place to assist the 
navigation among discrepancies in legislation.  As such, overlapping functions and 
conflicting objectives among agencies remain an unresolved issue.   
With increasing democratization of Indonesian society, which is clearly also 
affecting water resources management structures across the archipelago, changes are 
underway following the enactment of Law No. 7 in 2004 to reformulate the make-up of 
coordinating committees at all levels (national, provincial, basin and district) to formally 
extend participation to stakeholders and interest groups directly. The  National Water 
Council, an apex body at the national level, will replace the Tim Kordinasi, which is a 
Ministerial team that is currently responsible for coordinating water resource policy 
making at the national level.  The Apex body will manage a coordination framework for 
national water resources, with responsibility for guidance in policy formulation, resource 
allocation, program implementation, regulatory control, inter-sectoral coordination, and 
issue resolution. It will comprise various ministers and stakeholder representatives, 
playing an important part in presenting an integrated approach and commitment to water 
resources management at the national level.  
6.5 Water Management Instruments 
Compared to many other (developing) countries and to other basins in Indonesia, the 
Brantas basin has a number of management instruments in place and these can explain 
part of the PJT I’s performance in this past decade. They include use of water licenses, 
water use fees for at least two water user groups (industries and municipalities), licensing 
for sand excavation in river channels, communication with a number of stakeholders, 
including  public accessibility of data as well as educational activities, a transparently 
applied water allocation mechanism, based on a well-maintained water monitoring 
network. These instruments and the application in the Brantas basin are highlighted in 
this section.  
Water Use Rights, Allocation and Conflict Resolution.   
Indonesia’s water rights system involves water use rights. In Indonesia’s Constitution of 
1945, water resources are ultimately governed by the state, to be utilized for the welfare 
of the people.  Water Resources Law No. 11/1974 identifies water as a gift of the  
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Almighty that everyone has a right to use, though certain uses require permission.  In 
1982, Government Regulation No. 22 stated that permission is not necessary for basic 
daily needs, domestic purposes and for livestock.  According to both Water Resources 
Management Law No.  11/1974 and East Java Governor’s Decree No. 316/1988, water 
allocation priorities exist among domestic use, agriculture, industry and hydropower 
generation in that order. Allocations among specific users, however, are not clearly 
defined, nor is prioritization with respect to long-term and emergency water shortages, 
which means that this is open for interpretation. There is also no reference made to river 
maintenance flow and its relevance to water quality preservation. As such, river water 
quality is managed at PJT I’s discretion and low flow augmentation to maintain water 
quality falls behind water deliveries to licensed users and irrigation.  The new Water Law 
No. 7/2004 further excludes public irrigation systems (farm holdings below 2 ha) from 
obtaining water use rights through a permit and classifies it as a basic need. For non-basic 
needs, the priority of water allocation is left to the regional governments according to 
basin needs.  However, the law does mandate the establishment of a framework for water 
use rights with domestic needs and existing public irrigation being of the highest priority.  
The water use rights of public irrigation systems may not be traded or transferred lest 
small farmers become disenfranchised of their rights by commercial interests (water 
bottling industries, golf courses, etc) who can afford to buy farmer water use rights. 
Water licensing was formally established in the Brantas basin in 1991, and 
involves a process that takes three months to complete. A water user requests a license 
from the Governor. By Government regulation, PJT I completes a technical assessment, 
reconciling the requested quantity and location of the demands with predicted water 
supply and availability.  Both the district (Kotamadya/Kabupaten) and PJT I provide a 
technical recommendation to the Governor, who then awards the license to the user.  The 
new water law stipulates that requests will go directly to the PPTPA (the basin water 
resources coordinating committee) before going to the Governor, so as to shorten the 
process and permit stakeholder involvement. This suggests a further empowerment 
through participation (`voice and choice’) to basin-level institutions.  Also, according to 
the new water law, licenses will be instituted for main intakes of irrigation systems that 
serve non-subsistence farmers and other commercial uses in the irrigation system.  
As a collective or usufruct property right, a water use right is very flexible, which 
is useful under unpredictable or changing conditions. Flexibility is often emphasized as 
the reason why water use rights should be maintained.  Such flexibility is difficult to 
capture in formal or statutory law, however,   modern concepts advancing water use 
rights are slowly being accepted within Indonesian society, but many politicians fear the 
transferability of rights and the prospect of losing control of water  resources to local and 
foreign interests through privatization.   
The Provincial Water Resources Committee (PTPA) serves as a coordinative 
body to provide operational policy direction for the Brantas basin water resource 
development and management. It meets twice a year – before the rainy season and before 
the dry season – to decide upon water allocation among various users and the rule curve 
for reservoir operation.  Made up of 80% governmental representatives and 20% non-
governmental representatives, participants are to discuss allocation, pollution control, 
flood management, and information concerning water demand against the water balance.   
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Demand information is collected by the Deputy Governor and provided to the Technical 
Committee of the PTPA, comprising PJT I, three Balai PSDA managing SWS with 
smaller rivers within the basin, and the Provincial Water Resources Services.  Before a 
PTPA meeting, the Technical Committee analyzes this information to calculate the water 
balance against climate information and expected demand.  This, in turn, is presented to 
the PTPA, and if accepted, is signed by the Vice Governor.  If there is need for a 
significant modification in the allocation pattern, this is discussed in the PTPA for 
revision.   
Conflict of interest among stakeholders exists, particularly during the dry season, 
when there is not enough water available to cover all sector water demands.  Irrigation 
water users, the largest water consumers (almost 80% of water during the dry season), 
receive only 60-80% of their water demand.  During the dry season, PJT I reduces 
allocation for irrigators once a week, without reduction for licensed users. Under drought 
conditions, irrigation allocation is reduced to 55%, while other sectors stay at 100%.  
When there is a shortage in water supply, the PTPA participants decide to reduce the 
irrigation sector’s water allocation before reducing others.  The Provincial Irrigation 
Committee (Provincial Irrigation Commission in future) and the Balai PSDA members 
collect information concerning main-intake demand and communicate impending 
reductions to farmers, but do not seem to represent farmers’ concerns in PTPA or 
PPTPA.  Water shortage is a common problem in most areas of the basin to irrigation 
farmers, and many farmers complain that water is not available when needed or is 
insufficient when available during the dry season. (JICA 1998). Institutional 
developments are underway to organize farmer interests through federations of water 
users associations (GP3As) and to have farmers participate more directly in decision-
making at the river basin level through a newly formulated PPTPA structure and the 
various District Irrigation Commissions which include  GP3A  or Stream Level 
Committee/Induk  representation. 
With respect to conflict resolution, the Provincial Water Resources Service Office 
(Dinas PUP) normally handles conflicts among users in the irrigation system (upstream-
downstream conflicts, conflicts between uses) through a negotiation process.  Instances 
of informal water use rights exchange between users and types of uses have taken place. 
Intersectoral conflicts concerning water allocation among other stakeholders are handled 
by PJT I within the PTPA. PJT I has a close relationship with its licensed stakeholders, 
who consider PJT I staff to be a professional and objective third party on an equal plane 
with them. PJT I is also called upon by licensed stakeholders to communicate 
stakeholders’ concerns to the East Java Governor and to mediate their conflicts with 
NGOs or polluters. 
6.6 Water Fees and Financing Brantas Basin Management.  
Financially, PJT I  strives to be self-supporting, receiving its revenue primarily from 
municipal and industrial water supply and water supply for hydro-power generation and, 
to a lesser extent from consulting, sand mining, tourism and leasing of land.  Tariff-
setting, however, is not in its hands and is decided through a political process. The 
Ministry of Finance sets tariffs for hydropower users.  The Provincial government sets 




As a state-owned company, PJT I is required to show budget surplus for it to be 
considered a healthy corporation (at the cost of adequate maintenance).  PJT I also 
promotes non-water service activities (consulting, tourism, river sand mining services) to 
raise funds.  The annual budget has to be approved by the Ministry of Finance, ensuring 
Central Government oversight over its finances.   
PJT I does not collect enough money to cover O&M.  The highest amount of 
O&M costs the PJT I has been able to cover was 60% in 1996.  After the economic crisis 
in 1997, the corporation could only cover 31% of the normal budget because of inflation 
and because many beneficiaries did not want to pay the tariff.  The central government 
assists with maintenance and rehabilitation of the river basin and  irrigation   
infrastructure through a direct budget where the operator cannot afford to cover O&M, 
for instance, through a block grant to the Provincial Government. The Central 
Government provides PJT I with about Rp. 50 million (~ US$5,556) for flood control, 
but this is not sufficient to cover costs. PJT I’s flood control budget is used as a source of 
revenue when there is no flood. The Central government also provides  funds for 
infrastructure rehabilitation through central projects, which is considered a public service 
offering.  The policy of Public Service Obligation was started recently, and refers to 
partial funding by government ministries for public services in accordance with 
budgetary monies available.  As more clearly specified in the new water law, the Ministry 
of Finance is obligated to provide funds to river basin management agencies for public 
service and welfare issues.  The cost of social benefit should be borne by government, not 
by beneficiaries. 
PJT I  operates a resort area along the Selorejo reservoir with the interest of 
promoting recreation, tourism, and water sports within the basin  and rents out its land for 
agricultural purposes. For developing such non-water sources of income, which 
comprised 25% of revenues in 2003, PJT I seems to have some level of autonomy as long 
as they fulfill their larger organizational objectives and make PJT I a profitable 
corporation.  
With respect to resource endowments, industry, hydropower, municipal water 
suppliers earn far higher revenues than the agricultural sector and pay service fees in 
exchange for a regular water supply for their operations.  It seems to be generally 
understood among licensed stakeholders that they are taking on disproportionately large 
costs and subsidizing basin management costs because irrigation farmers might not be 
able to afford to pay water service fees, or that obtaining fees from them is difficult given 
monitoring and coordination costs.  Farmers make up most of the Brantas basin’s 
population. According to a survey study prepared by JICA in 1996, land farmed in the 
Brantas basin tends to be in small parcels of less than 0.50 ha/family, and farmers 
supplement their on-farm income with off-farm income. Irrigation farmers pay a 
contribution in the form of paddy as a WUA membership fee, leaving them with few 
resources to contribute to basin-level O&M service fees. 
The revenue regulations issued after the enactment of Law No 25 on Fiscal 
Equalization in 1999 call for service fees (e.g. water service tariffs) collected by a 
national public corporation within the jurisdiction of a provincial and local government to 
be shared with the said governments (`retribusi’).  This may or may not affect the revenue 
collected by PJT I and the net balance available for transfer to the Ministry of Finance.   
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Furthermore, the new Water Resources Law provides for a collection of a basin Water 
Resources Management Fee [article 77(3)] to pay for the planning, O&M and 
management administration costs of basin water resources management.  However, 
Article 80(2) of the law exempts smallholder agriculture (with land holdings less than 2 
ha) in public irrigation schemes from this fee.  For other water users, the fee is 
determined by the volume of use and their economic capacity (i.e. affordability).  The 
application of this new fee is still to be regulated by the issue of a Government 
Regulation.  In principle, this would become an additional source of revenue from non-
smallholder irrigation and other customers of PJT I and enable it to meet more of its 
O&M expenses.  This, however, depends on whether: (a) the various levels of 
government agree that this fee may be added to the existing tariffs; (b) a portion thereof is 
not claimed by provincial and local governments in the form of `retribusi’; and (c) 
proceeds thereof are not to be included in the balance sheet surplus to be transferred to 
MoF. 
6.7 Water Monitoring.  
PJT I monitors hydro-meteorological data, water use, water quality, and financial data. 
During the dry season, it monitors the operation rule issued through the PTPA every 10 
days to verify that the pattern follows predictions. PJT I does not manage all intakes; 
intakes for hydropower plants, municipal water supply, and some irrigation areas are 
managed  and flows monitored by the water users themselves or by other 
provincial/district agencies.  Some industrial intakes use water meters.  Water use is 
estimated for those industries that do not use meters.  Those users that pay do so on a 
volumetric basis after they have received the water.  
During the rainy season, PJT I focuses on flood management, monitoring rainfall 
intensity and discharge along the Brantas River through the Flood Forecasting and 
Warning system.  For basin wide monitoring of  water quality, the Provincial Water 
Resource Services Office collects water quality data from the Balai PSDAs, as well as 
data from PJT I, and reports it each month to the Governor. PJT I monitors water quality, 
collects data, and reports to the Bappedalda Office ( Provincial Environmental Control 
Office), who, in turn, require concerned agencies and  local police to enforce pollution 
control regulations and/or seek the legal remedies available.   
PJT I is currently constructing a real-time water monitoring system on water 
quality.  They monitor pollution from a central station in Lengkong Mojokerto, and have 
constructed a lab in Malang that is awaiting certification.  According to the head of an 
advocacy organization that works on capacity building activities in the basin, 14 
industries discharge polluted water in the Brantas, and thus far they have taken one to 
court using monitoring data from PJT I. However, though PJT I’s data is technically 
sound, their data has no authority without official certification, so currently the court 
tends to be in favor of factory data. Why such certification has not been issued by KLH 
or local environmental agencies is not clear. 
Communication 
PJT I is very proactive in providing information concerning water resources management 
and issues. Staff disseminate brochures and participate in exhibitions each year for local 
government and in Jakarta.  Some local governments invite them as speakers as well.   
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They seek local TV and radio exposure regarding water issues and open discussion 
forums.  PJT I supports research and seminars at the University of Brawijaya and at the 
University of Education, Malang in the areas of agriculture, basic science, and 
engineering.  They maintain a website with real-time information concerning pollution 
levels and water levels assessed at various locations of the basin, obtained through their 
monitoring activities.  Senior management of  PJT I actively participate in national and 
international seminars to provide information and highlight issues related to IWRM and 
actively promote in the corporation’s management  the  best  practices gathered from 
other basins.   Since decentralization reforms have been in place, staff of PJT I feel as 
though they have to re-promote PJT I as an organizations because too many local 
government officials who are newcomers are not aware of who they are and their 
functions.   
At this time, the Provincial Water Resources Committee (PTPA) is a public 
accountability mechanism, through which PJT I reports water balance information to 
governmental entities representing stakeholders. Though some stakeholders participate 
(PDAM, PLN), they are not considered to be official members.  PJT I receives feedback 
concerning sedimentation and water quality problems within the PTPA, but for the most 
part, it is a forum to discuss water allocation decisions.  In the new water law, 
representation in PTPA and PPTPA  is to be balanced between the  government and  non-
governmental agencies, and they will have a broader role much  more than just water 
allocation. These committees will become coordination bodies where decisions on 
management policies (planning, implementing, supervising, controlling, and funding) are 
to be made. 
7. Analysis 
In this section we will analyze how the previously identified analytical factors deemed to 
affect the outcomes of decentralization of river basin  management structures have 
affected the Brantas basin and the performance of its management system since the 
institution of the PJT I. 
7.1 Contextual Factors and Initial Conditions 
The steady economic growth during the Suharto regime came to a dramatic halt with the 
1997 financial crises, coupled with the collapse of the autocratic regime. Indonesia’s 
weak institutions, a poor legal and regulatory framework, ineffective bureaucracy, and 
endemic corruption made it difficult for Indonesia to withstand political uncertainty and 
an economic downturn.  The effects of the crisis upon Indonesia were worse than for 
many of its Southeast Asian neighbors. The Government launched a four-pronged 
strategy of policy and institutional reform based upon macro-economic management, 
financial and corporate restructuring, protection for the poor and of human assets, and 
reform of economic instruments and institutions.  A number of donor agencies jointly 
participated in an IMF-led restructuring program in FY1998-1999. The program has 
included policy, legal, and institutional reforms in a number of public service sectors, 
including the water resources sector. Since 1999, the country has gradually recovered 
macroeconomic and political stability, but it is still vulnerable and limited in its capacity 
to obtain development funding.  The IMF program, terminated in December 2003, has 
been  replaced by economic recovery policies by the Indonesian Government.  It is within  
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the context of these economic constraints that proactive institutional change in the water 
sector is being carried forward at the national level. 
Two distinct phases can thus clearly be distinguished in the macro context of 
Brantas basin management. First, PJT I was created during the Suharto regime, indicating 
that the previous government realized the need for a better approach to ensure 
management, operation and maintenance of the infrastructure created by the Brantas 
Project. While the creation of PJT I constituted a modicum of decentralization in the form 
of devolution of national government responsibility through deconcentration of 
administration, it has still been dominated by the central government. The second phase, 
which is characterized by democratization in recent years, places more emphasis on 
stakeholder involvement and the recent decision reorganizing steering and water 
resources committees reflect this trend. The autonomy and decentralization laws put a 
greater pressure on PJT I to be answerable to the regional Governments (Provincial and 
Districts) in many aspects of basin water management.  Thus, the political and economic 
macro contexts have had a clear influence on Brantas basin management and have 
conditioned the way it has worked out. An interesting point is that even under a 
centralized regime, a  certain devolution of management decision making to the river 
basin level was possible. This provides an example for other countries that have strong 
centralized structures, but may be considering more effective basin-level water resources 
management. 
7.2 Characteristics of the Decentralization Process 
Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution, hastily drawn up at the time of its independence, bestows 
strong powers upon the executive branch, giving the President the authority to determine 
the nature of regional autonomy.   The pursuit of a strong unitary government has 
historically been an executive response to the sprawling archipelago’s extremely high 
level of cultural, ethnic, language, and economic diversity.  During his New Order reign 
(1969-1998), General Suharto consolidated powers at the center and reduced or 
eliminated resisting elements in society.  Provinces and districts, established through Law 
No.  4/1974, were held in check through very clear subservient roles in the name of 
maintaining national unity. The Central Government set policies and regulations, 
provinces undertook coordination and supervision duties as agents of the center, and 
districts were responsible for implementation.  In time, over 90% of government revenues 
were accrued to the center, and large conditional central transfers limited local autonomy. 
(Ferrazzi 2000).  In 1998, immense student pressure and general unrest forced Suharto to 
resign. The 1997-1998 financial crisis, attributed to extensive government corruption and 
weak institutional development factored into this.   Law No.  22/1999 on Local 
Government devolved Central Government powers and responsibilities to district-level 
governments in many administrative sectors.   
Given the history of centralization and interest in maintaining political stability 
and continued unification, decentralization of water resources management authority, 
though involving a “big bang” event to initiate it, has in practice embodied an iterative 
shedding process, such as we have observed in the case of the Brantas basin. The 
decentralization process was clearly top-down. Interestingly, even with this process key 
water users and stakeholders adhere to PJT I’s “rules”, i.e. payments of water use  fees, 
which permit the company to function. As pointed out above, these stakeholders –  
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notably industries and municipalities – do have an interest in a functioning water delivery 
framework and, are overall willing to contribute to it (albeit not sufficiently to cover full 
operation and maintenance costs of the system). An important contributing factor to this 
relative success of the PJT I seems to have been its outreach capacity towards 
stakeholders, indicating that a well-managed decentralization process can yield good 
results if communication with key stakeholders is established , both through formal and 
informal channels, and when they see tangible benefits. – This reasoning also holds when 
comparing it to the Brantas basin’s pollution problems where, up to now, no stakeholder 
is actively contributing and where political pressure has not yet been strong enough to (i) 
implement the polluter-pays-principle, nor to (ii) designate one organization with 
adequate legal authority and incentive to deal with pollution and the economic pressures 
and commercial interests that cause it to continue. With pollution not affecting the main 
water users (industries and farmers) and municipal and district governments being 
notoriously weak in the face of economic growth and employment generation imperatives 
(and possibly having more incentives to build trans-basin schemes or wastewater 
treatment plants rather than going for “soft” regulatory solutions), it is a difficult-to-
resolve issue where incentives are not yet adequately set.  
With regard to the future outlook, the passage of the new Water Law distinctly 
signals Central Government commitment to continued reform of the water resources 
sector in accordance with the agreed action plan developed under the World Bank 
assisted Water Sector Adjustment Loan (WATSAL). The Law was initially drafted in 
2002 and underwent a great deal of debate and discussion both inside and outside of   
Parliament before its passage in March 2004. The amount and length of debate prior to 
the law’s passage was due to a lack of consensus among agencies and legislators 
concerning particular issues, such as extent of irrigated farmer protection, the 
privatization of certain water resource service functions and the establishment of 
transferable water use rights.  Strong disagreement over particulars of the decentralization 
process may very well prove divisive to Central Government commitment to a fast roll-
out of decentralization reforms through future governmental transitions.  However, that 
dialogue and debate are taking place openly among a broader set of actors in Indonesian 
society - that legislators and members of civil society are participating in in-depth 
dialogue with Central Government Ministry actors – reflects that in the larger sense, 
reforms have been implemented and are being exercised. The resulting revision of the 
autonomy and fiscal decentralization laws in September 2004 has to some extent 
harmonized views on decentralization by providing a say to the central and provincial 
governments on issues of autonomy and fiscal decentralization. 
7.3 Characteristics of Central Government/Basin-Level Relationships and Capacities 
The Continued Role of Central Government 
Much power still resides with Central Government ministries for planning and policy-
making within strategic river basins like the Brantas.  The authority to oversee the 
management and functioning of PJT-I lies with the center through Ministry of  Public 
Works  with the Ministry of Finance exercising the fiscal oversight role.  In accordance 
with Water Law No. 11/1974 and Law No. 7/2004, the MPW  has supervisory control of 
PJT I.  The Supervisory Board of PJT I, with five members from Central and Provincial 
Governments, undertakes general supervision of PJT I’s program, work plan, and budget,  
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and answers to the Ministry of Finance and MPW .  The Supervisory Board does not 
have a stakeholder advisory group to work with or any other form of stakeholder 
institution overseeing its policies and performance (although this may change with the 
advent of a Basin Water Resources Council ).   It structurally reflects the authority of the  
MPW  and Ministry of Finance over basin-level interests.  The Governor of East Java 
however also sits on the Board, which helps to facilitate coordination and implementation 
locally.  
PJT I as the Executing Agency   
PJT I is responsible for operating, maintaining, and managing water resources on behalf 
of the Central Government, which is the owner of the infrastructure in the Brantas basin.  
The infrastructure assets have not been transferred to PJT I nor are they given on a 
concession basis because of PJT I’s limits to adequately finance large-scale construction 
and rehabilitation.  Government Regulations very specifically delineate PJT I’s activities. 
PJT I is assigned to plan and operate day-to-day activities, maintain records, undertake 
minor maintenance, and assume responsibility for operational management.  The 
company can undertake some rehabilitation activities within its financial limits that are 
necessary for operational purposes.  Any subsequent changes or expansions to these 
activities through Ministry of  Public Works  decrees have been introduced to suit 
ministry needs or water resource conditions within the basin (such as for PJT I’s water 
quality monitoring capacity), without offering any changes in authority roles, 
responsibility, or financing mechanisms. This is consistent with how Decentralization 
Law 22/1999, which provides specific functions for local government without general 
authority or new means of raising revenue, an aspect that is covered under the Law on 
fiscal balance between Center and Region No. 25 of 1999. 
While all the above depicts a de-concentration rather than decentralization of 
Central Government activities to a basin level institution to serve national-level 
objectives and local level interests, it must be understood that in the context of a unitary 
country holding objectives of fiscal recovery and political stability, decentralization is 
undertaken more carefully, and particularly so within the Brantas basin. The central 
government maintains a large degree of authority over PJT I’s financial and decision-
making functions because it is in their interest to manage the Brantas PJT I.  Large water 
infrastructure projects with high cost investments involve Central government 
responsibility for loan repayment.  The ability of regional and local government to raise 
that level of revenue is generally not there, and the Governor’s priorities  may differ from 
the Central Government’s sectoral interests.  
In light of the current institutional set-up, PJT I does not have a lot of autonomy 
to create and modify institutional arrangements to better suit its needs and circumstances, 
but it nonetheless uses its entrepreneurship and interest in outreach to garner support for 
particular objectives where it can.  
Local Basin  Stakeholders   
Prior to decentralization reforms, service provision was vertically managed through 
deconcentration of central government responsibilities.  Given the centralizing force of 
Suharto’s New Order government and the deconcentrated role of regional government, 
there was little stakeholder involvement or coordination made in decision-making,  
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implementation, or monitoring.   Some government offices, such as implementation 
offices, boards, regional secretariats, and technical units were under the administrative 
authority of the Province and funded from the APBD (regional budget), which partly 
served on behalf of the central government.  Other government offices were under the 
administrative authority of the Central Government and funded by its APBN (central 
budget), which operated within a particular province, district, or municipality, such as 
Central Government field offices.  Decentralization reassigned deconcentrated civil 
servants to the regions.  Thus, while there was experience in service provision as funded 
through central government coffers, there was little experience with self-governance 
(fiscal autonomy, devolution of authority, stakeholder involvement) at the local or 
regional level.  
Likewise, with the water sector, the Central Government used relevant line 
agencies, government corporations, or experts as stakeholder voices to obtain input. 
Stakeholder participation in water sectoral activities was  limited to irrigation farmers’ 
participation in WUAs, and this too not vigorously pursued in terms of enabling real 
community empowerment. Thus, prior to the 1999 reforms, experience in service 
provision existed at the local level, but  with little experience in self-governance.  Much 
experience is still to be gained to effectively involve stakeholders, raise funds to cover 
costs, horizontally integrate water resource management activities, and undertake 
planning and policy-making at the basin level.   
Indonesia being a unitary country that had until recently been centralized, basin-
level stakeholders do not generally have a high level of influence upon central 
government actors, but there are degrees of relative influence among basin stakeholders, 
particularly where central government has a stake in their operations.  PLN (Power 
Corporation) and PJT I are state-owned companies that have direct relationships with 
Central Government ministries. PDAMs are local-government-owned companies that 
draw raw  water via supply systems constructed by MPW . A second means by which 
stakeholders are endowed with national-level political influence in this setting is where 
the basin stakeholders’ interests fit the interests of the basin’s Master Plan, which serves 
Central Government long-term interests.   
Irrigation farmers were the central focus of Master Plans I and II.  The lack of 
influence of  irrigation farmers among national level policy makers towards basin 
management and achievement of rice self sufficiency in 1984 (a national goal) may be 
the reason that  Master Plans III and IV took on a new focus: urban and industrial 
development and integrated water resources management.  As such industrial interests 
may now have center stage as compared with irrigation, particularly in the post-fiscal 
crisis era, where economic recovery has been an imperative. 
Decentralization reforms in Indonesia are continuing to be customized according 
to ongoing lessons learned. Time and experience has certainly contributed to PJT I’s 
legitimacy as an operator within the Brantas river basin.  PJT I has developed strong 
relationships with various stakeholder groups, universities, and NGOs and is well trusted 
to manage water supply and flood control issues. While there is still considerable ground 
to cover regarding broader and more direct stakeholder involvement as well as 
coordination and integration across agencies, it appears as though there is a general sense 
of expectation and enthusiasm among stakeholders regarding the direction toward which  
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institutional and policy changes are heading.  There also appears to be a realistic 
understanding that implementing decentralization is a lengthy and iterative process.  
7.4 The Internal Configuration of Basin-level Institutional Arrangements 
PJT I is a notable organization in a river basin management context because it is a state-
owned company, with clearly delineated management responsibilities and a profit motive. 
This construct has permitted the company to (i) focus on the river basin as the 
management unit and (ii) focus on management rather than development and 
construction. Importantly, this set-up has also endowed the company with credibility that 
the funds it receives from water users will be reapplied in the basin, an important 
condition to ensure stakeholders’ willingness to financially contribute to basin 
management expenses.  
As outlined earlier in this paper, within its responsibilities, PJT I has been rather 
successful and the Brantas basin has turned into a well-known example not only in 
Indonesia but also in an international context of how water resources can be more 
effectively be managed at the river-basin level.  
The weak point in the overall institutional arrangements is related to the fact that: 
(i) PJT I does not have a clear mandate and a  management role with respect to the two 
more recent water resources management challenges in the basin, notably the high degree 
of point and non-point pollution as well as deforestation in the upper reaches of the basin, 
leading to major erosion problems; and (ii) it has not yet been given a management 
concession to undertake overall monitoring of effluent discharges, implement an effluent 
discharge fee and retain its proceeds to finance monitoring activities; and (iii) it has not 
been given a mandate to operate its reservoirs for low-flow augmentation to improve in-
stream water quality while adjusting/reducing deliveries to other water users such as 
public irrigation schemes. The coordinative activities it must undertake in support of its 
water resource management objectives are consequently quite complicated and 
confusing.  These weaknesses have not permitted it to address some of the important 
management issues, nor have these been picked up by other responsible institutions.  
With the latest round of institutional reforms to be implemented, this situation 
may change. It indicates, however, that the rather centralized approach does not favor 
quick adaptation of the system to new decentralization and the political-economic 
dimension of socio-technical issues and challenges.  
7.5 Other Factors 
In each case study, there have been important factors relating to the emergence and 
success of basin management which were not envisioned in our analytical framework.  
This is in the nature of research on institutions, which are always shaped by particular 
contexts and therefore exhibit unanticipated or even idiosyncratic features.   
One important factor in the success of the PJT I, which in its initial stage had to 
implement such unpopular measures as water use fees, seems to be a strongly dedicated 
staff and a succession of corporate heads who believed in a transparent and well managed  
company and who used strong communication skills to build the PJT I into a respected, 
well-functioning institution.   
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A further factor seems to have been the pragmatic manner of dealing with 
different water management challenges in the basin. While erosion and pollution 
problems  already existed from the outset – if not as severely as nowadays – PJT I has 
focused on its basic mandate of good O&M rather than assuming many other 
responsibilities. On the one hand, this approach does not solve these problems, but it has 
permitted to deal with the first set of issues and create an effective institutional and 
organizational base before expanding into new and more contentious institutional 
problems. This stepwise, pragmatic approach may have been wiser than going for full 
“integration” of dealing with all water-related problems at the same time, an approach 
that sometimes does not lead to any solution and consequent institutional weakness.   
Finally, with regard to the institutional changes currently underway, a rather 
significant factor in the Indonesian case is the existence of the water sector reform 
program, a reform package with substantial external assistance through the World Bank 
assisted WATSAL loan to pursue these reforms. Crisis is often a factor cited for 
instigating institutional change. This has been witnessed in a number of the case studies, 
where crises of water scarcity or water quality prompted the development of river basin 
management as an issue-level response.  Indonesia’s profound political and economic 
crisis in 1997-1998 required an immediate and large-scale multi-sectoral response.  This 
crisis prompted the Reformasi Government to seek external assistance from the IMF and 
a number of donor agencies to design and finance an ambitious reform agenda in a 
number of sectors. In 1998, the World Bank approved a US$300 million three-tranche 
Water Sector Loan (WATSAL) to the Indonesian Government to provide balance of 
payments assistance in support of reforms in the management of the water resources and 
irrigation sectors.  In 1999, the Indonesian Government initiated a major sector reform 
program that embodies four main objectives under the WATSAL project. This loan is 
part of the IMF recovery package for Indonesia and was terminated as of December 
2004. Parts of this water sector reform has been included in the 100 day Action Plan of 
the new Government inaugurated in October 2004.  
The new Water Law, passed in March 2004, is a major water sector reform to 
replace the original Water Law of 1974 and all its related regulations in all areas and all 
levels of water resources management.  It addresses a number of existing institutional 
shortcomings in the achievement of integrated water resources management.  Several 
Government Regulations have been drafted to support the new Water Law. The 
completion of the water sector reform in 2005, including the  implementation  of the new 
Water Law, is expected to enable real decentralization of authority in basin WRM. Many 
of the shortcomings to the current institutional arrangements are addressed in upcoming 
legal instruments and reform activities.  Considerable changes in the water sector are 
underway, consequently creating significant uncertainty at all levels of governance and 
government. But the transparency of the overall reform agenda and its sustained progress 
has provided direction for all levels of government and civil society, fostering dialogue 
and preparing for institutional change.  
8. Stakeholder’s Motivations, Incentives, and Actions 
The purpose of this research project is to examine when and why “river basin 
management at the lowest appropriate level” works in practice. From the above, it has  
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become clear that, while the establishment of the PJT I certainly was a devolution of 
decision making to a lower level, it did not constitute a full decentralization, but  a 
deconcentration of power. It is clear that the different stakeholder groups have varying 
interests in further decentralization and their motives, incentives and actions in this 
regard are examined in this section.  
8.1 Water Users 
Water users’ main interest is adequate – and cheap - quantities of reliable water supplies 
of satisfactory quality.  This shared interest among competing user groups can result in 
conflict in times of water scarcity.  For instance, sugarcane factories take 33% of total 
industrial demand, and much of sugar cane crushing takes place during the dry season. 
Thus in low-flow years, irrigation supplies are diverted to meet industrial demand, and 
this results in crop losses.  Water users thus have an interest in a well-managed allocation 
process as well as in a process ensuring adequate water quality and in-stream standards 
for their respective purposes (which however vary).   
Hydropower (PLN) is most interested in reliable water supply as well as sediment 
control for its operations. PLN directly participates in the PTPA, and obtains its 
allocation with little or no conflict with other consumptive users, although their required 
reservoir water release patterns for hydropower generation may create problems for a 
reliable irrigation water supply in the dry season. 
Municipal suppliers and industries that must treat water for production, find the 
issue of water quality to be equally important to supply.  Degraded water quality forces 
them to assume higher production costs.  They must either pass these costs along to 
consumers or reduce production (or service coverage in the case of PDAM) to remain 
profitable. The municipal water supplier Surabaya PDAM has little control over sewerage 
discharged in the upstream reaches or the sources of effluents that seriously degrade the 
quality of water it treats to drinking standards. The high costs of treatment consequently 
prevent them from meeting existing demands in Surabaya, posing a serious threat to 
public health, particularly for poor residents. The lack of clear authority and coordination 
to effectively address water quality degradation issues in the basin translates to high long-
run operation costs for a treatment plant, making other high-cost water transfer projects 
from distant springs an attractive option. 
Those stakeholders, such as PLN and PDAM, which have a close working 
relationship with PJT I, are content with PJT I’s performance in water supply and flood 
control and believe its relationship with the central government to be an asset.  They 
generally commend PJT I for the initiative that it has taken towards sediment and 
pollution control, recognizing that these issues are not entirely within PJT I’s control. 
They see the need for PJT I to have greater authority to coordinate solutions to these 
problems.    
A few stakeholders, such as irrigation districts, which interact directly with 
provincial offices, might believe that PJT I’s functions could be better handled by the 
province for more effective coordination with the objectives of the Governor, who is 
ultimately responsible for issues of water pollution, flood control, issuing licenses, etc. 
Irrigators have the perception that PJT I, because of its dependence on revenue generating 
water users, is to some extent not able to safeguard their interests. This is compounded by  
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the fact that there currently is no formal institutional mechanism for irrigators to dialogue 
with PJT I. 
8.2 Brantas Basin Corporation (PJT I) 
PJT I is most interested in carrying out its functions successfully and recovering costs 
through revenue.  It is charged by MPW  with managing, maintaining and operating 
infrastructure in the 40 major tributaries and rivers and carrying out tasks to help allocate 
bulk water, manage and protect the basin from floods, manage water quality in the 
streams and help conserve the watershed. As a state corporation, it is  charged with 
showing a fixed return on investment ( PJT I is designated as a Perum that by Law cannot 
make profit in the business sense but must balance its costs and revenue budgets each 
year) in order to continue operations. Thus, it searches for opportunities for increase of 
revenue, whether it be through water user fees or non-water services. PJT I is currently 
interested in developing capacity to collect fees from polluting industries to provide 
another source of revenue, which it also has the legal basis for.  Aside from raising 
revenue, it also limits expenditure from reducing operational costs by limiting the amount 
of O&M it plans.  PJT I staff recognize this conflict of interest between these two roles 
and work to balance responsibilities. However, as exemplified in the case of the irrigation 
sector, water users who do not pay a fee and whose interests are not part of the objectives 
of the current Master Plan – and thus do not contribute to either of PJT I’s areas of 
responsibility – might have lower priority in the water allocation decision-making 
process without an explicit institutional mechanism to bring their interests to the table 
(such as the proposed apex WUAF representation on a Basin WRM Council).   
PJT I staff have an interest in portraying PJT I as professional, unbiased, and 
expert in the areas that it is responsible for.  This assists its coordinative role with 
stakeholders, both at the basin and provincial levels while the central government 
considers it a legitimate authority for the activities it carries out. It is through this 
coordination approach and proactive management style that PJT I develops good working 
relationships with formal and informal institutions to be effective in many aspects of 
WRM.  
Though PJT I does not have much authority and autonomy, being closely 
supervised by the central government, there is a strong incentive for staff of PJT I to want 
it to remain under Central Government authority.  The MPW is instrumental in the 
appointment of PJT I’s directors, and about 100 central government employees have been 
transferred to work for PJT I. It is in the central government’s interest to transfer 
individuals who likely have water resource management experience and expertise to 
operate and maintain their infrastructure.  PJT I also has access to a larger amount of 
funds for project development than would be available through Provincial affiliation. PJT 
I can afford to pay its employees twice as much as employees in line agencies of public 
works sectors, attracting better skilled applicants. These employees feel that they can 
rotate into other responsible positions in the central government system if they perform 
well. These factors contribute to prestige and legitimacy at the basin level among 




PJT I was established before decentralization reforms took place, under a different 
set of interests than local autonomy.  That its assets have not been transferred has not 
been challenged. On the other hand Provincial Government may not wish to exercise 
ownership over the assets because of financial needs for the upkeep of the infrastructure.  
PJT I’s long-term master plan (1999-2020), prepared with JICA’s assistance, indicates 
that PJT I would like to expand its responsibilities. One recommendation is to discontinue 
the Brantas Project Office and take on its role.  It would also like to assume the role of 
the Volcanic Project Office, which is another central government line agency.  PJT I has 
the legal basis for taking these responsibilities on, but implementation is dependent upon 
financing and viability to receive sub-loans.  The question would remain if PJTI can be 
an effective water manager while taking on the role of implementing major water and 
volcanic debris control infrastructure as recommended by the JICA study. Also, MPW 
has had a longstanding role in water resources infrastructure development and has not 
been interested in devolving this function. 
Expanding its core responsibilities in a realistic manner gives PJT I greater 
influence as an official basin management entity, using its expertise to assist the Central 
Government in managing other strategic basins. Through a Presidential Decree in 2002 
the PJT I has been given the additional responsibility to manage the Solo River Basin that 
straddles East Java and Central Java provinces, which may later be spun off as a BUMN 
Corporation.  PJT I staff conduct their activities with the understanding that PJT I is a 
pilot whose model will be proliferated if successful. This perspective justifies central 
government authority of PJT I, as they see the central government jurisdiction as better 
for transferring knowledge from the PJT I pilot to other basin projects.   
8.3 The Province 
Provincial agencies are interested in increasing their budget and authority in water 
resources management.  Their interests are larger in scope as they coordinate and regulate 
many operational tasks.  As such, they are currently financially limited to deal with basin 
management.  However, according to the new Water Law, river basins that lie inside a 
province and are not nationally strategic should be managed by the Province, and 
Provinces throughout the country are interested in eventually being able to manage their 
basins and   generate water service revenue   through regional basin management 
corporations (BUMD).  They are wary of central government interests to dominate river 
basin development in areas of greater revenue raising potential, which circumvents their 
opportunity to receive funds. However, the Provincial Governments do not currently have 
the capital to fund the BUMDs. As such, while the central government has plans to create 
four more PJTs (Bengawan Solo, Serayu-Bogowonto, Jratuseluna, and Jeneberang) it 
must do so with an ear to Provincial-level support and legitimacy.  It is more politically 
viable at this time to have branches of PJT I operate in these  river basins for short 
periods, given its financially prudent track record, than to create new organizations, such 
as a PJT III. Provinces should be given time to decide on making these into BUMD PJTs 
or permit central government to upgrade these PJTI branches to become independent 
BUMN PJTs. 
Though decentralization reforms have transferred operational-level authority to 
regional governments, the central government maintains a large degree of control over 
policies to guide operations.  The Ministry of Public Works  has been long involved in  
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the infrastructure development, but came to recognize the importance of O&M, river 
channel improvement, and a strong basin-wide organization to manage its infrastructure.  
Since it can more easily obtain development loans to finance large construction projects 
than local level institutions, it has a particular interest in maintaining authority in basins 
whose economic development serve national interests.  Provincial interests embodied by 
the Governor--no matter how legitimate (efficiency, local control and revenue)--can 
conflict with central government objectives if authority is devolved to the province; 
hence the MPW ‘s  interest in retaining full financial control and bureaucratic power.   
The Provincial Governor’s position was previously that of a direct appointment of 
the Indonesian President, serving as a central government representative within the 
region. After decentralization reforms, this position has the capacity for more local 
autonomy.  Beginning in mid-2005 it is a position that must be filled through a popular 
election process and not confirmed by the President after being elected by Provincial 
Parliament as at present, endowing the office with more localized interests. In WRM, the 
Governor is given much authority for operational-level regulatory issues (licenses for 
abstraction and discharge, water pollution control, flood control, tariff setting etc.), but 
currently has marginal influence upon basin level policy-making in the PJT I case (a 
nationally strategic basin).  The Governor sits on PJT I’s supervisory board, but this 
serves local coordination purposes. The central government maintains authority over 
Brantas basin policy making, technical supervision and financing through directly 
supervising PJT I’s objectives, proposing tariff rates for differing sectors, financing flood 
control and rehabilitation activities, and so on. Thus, there are a number of reasons for the 
provincial government to be interested in further decentralization of basin decision 
making to the provinces, similar to other countries with federal structures, such as Brazil, 
Spain or the United States where states and provinces seek local decision-making powers 
over water.  
8.4 District-level government 
District level government actors are gaining a sense of their newly devolved authorities.  
They see themselves as equal to province-level actors, and as such it is difficult for the 
Province to coordinate activities across districts.  At this early stage, in light of many new 
responsibilities, local government actors are less likely to recognize their role in issues 
that are of a larger scale, involving negative externalities, as is the case with river basin 
management. Thus, coordination, information provision, outreach, and education are 
necessary to assist the district-level heads (Bupatis) to recognize their interest in actively 
participating in water resource management. Some amount of role sharing or 
deconcentration of responsibilities in basin management functions from the national 
government and the province can be anticipated, provided the higher level foots the bill 
in financing the activity. 
8.5 Central Government 
Given the economic importance of the Brantas basin as well as the huge investments it 
has benefited from in the last decades, the central government has strong incentives to 
keep strategic decision making power over the basin. While the PJT I can take day-to-day 
management decisions, it has no authority over major investment decisions and neither 
has the province, thus keeping the central government firmly in the driver’s seat. While  
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the current democratization of Indonesian society is clearly moving towards more 
participation by stakeholders in water resources management, the central government’s 
overall incentives are to keep control over key decision making issues, especially those 
related to financial control and administrative authority.  
9. Conclusion 
The Brantas basin case demonstrates a number of important features, which make it 
unique on the one hand, and provide interesting generic insights for river basin 
management on the other hand. These include: 
•  A proactive central government undertaking decentralization reforms, i.e. a “top-
down” generated approach, arising out of the recognition that water resources 
management activities best be undertaken at the basin level in order to achieve 
sustainable results.  
•  Creation of a state-owned semi-profit making corporation (Perum) with clear 
management, rather than water infrastructure development objectives, with a 
motive to balance revenue and expenditure while providing an attainable fixed 
return on limited commercial activity assets (to be paid to the central government) 
and with a subsidy for O&M of its hydraulic infrastructure providing public goods 
such as flood control etc. 
•  A succession of “champions” within the PJT I and its basin management 
approach. 
•  Within these innovative institutional arrangements, a number of water 
management instruments are in place and actively being implemented: annual 
water allocation based on a functioning monitoring system; existence of limited 
water use rights in the form of licensing of commercial water uses; and financial 
instruments such as volumetric water use fees; a well established in-stream water 
quality monitoring system. There are a functioning flood warning system and 
effective flood management. However, there are no instruments for water 
pollution control in place.  
•  Continued external donor financial and institutional development assistance 
through the national government that can afford the costs and expenditures 
involved, i.e. there is no full financial autonomy. 
•  With changing economic and environmental conditions in the basin, there is 
insufficient authority in PJT I to manage and coordinate larger integrated water 
resource management issues such as water quality and watershed management at 
the basin level.  PJT I is, nonetheless, successful with respect to tasks it is most 
directly responsible for. It uses the legitimacy it has gained through successful 
management to coordinate institutions in areas over which it has less control.  
•  Due to the novelty of the decentralization process, which is implemented in an 
iterative manner, there is still confusion in the relationships between many 
central, provincial, and local government actors. Also, many new coordinating 
bodies have been created, but there is as yet little clarification concerning 
authority.  Pressing issues such as water quality and catchment management  
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suffer from this problem of fragmentation of authority without clear coordination.  
The new Water Law provides clarification and guidance regarding roles and 
responsibilities. 
•  Structure of representation matters, and as stakeholders are, to date, represented 
by government actors in water resource decision-making, their interests are not 
directly voiced.  This is expected to change as participatory coordination units are 
developed at the national, provincial, and basin levels. 
Overall, water resources management in the Brantas basin is on a positive track. 
The management level in the basin compares favorably with many other river basins 
worldwide even though much still remains to be done and challenges keep growing. One 
of the ways chosen by the government to further improve basin management is to drive 
decentralization forward and to more actively involve key stakeholders including at the 
sub-national level (the province and districts) and actual water users (rather than their 
representatives at the sectoral government level). At the same time, however, the 
government continues to consider the Brantas a strategic basin and is keeping its overall 
powers.  
In practice, the decentralization process has been gradual and still largely reflects 
top-down arrangements: central government as policy maker with an executing agency as 
the implementer and with local government in an intermediate position. Decentralization 
in Indonesia has focused on devolving authority directly to district-level actors and this 
has created some level of confusion concerning relationships among and degrees of 
authority between the many central government, provincial, and local actors with 
overlapping responsibilities.  There is a move to provide the provinces more authority in 
the decentralized framework as the revised Law on Autonomy and Fiscal 
Decentralization of 2004 is implemented. 
Current reform activities are ongoing and weaknesses and strengths are being 
assessed with respect to the Indonesian context. The new institutional developments 
promise greater national level coordination, clearer provincial-district-basin level 
jurisdictional relationships, and expanded stakeholder involvement at all levels.   
Experience is accumulating through the development of different forms of basin 
institutional arrangements. Though there may be disagreement among central government 
actors as to how and how quickly decentralization should be rolled out, there is growing 
enthusiasm on the part of provincial and local government actors and civil society for 
further reform of water resources management institutions.  A key challenge in this 
process will be to develop the capacity, both fiscal and managerial, of the regional 
governments and to bring in stakeholders in an effective and productive way to tackle the 
major problems that the basin still faces. Participation by itself will not solve these issues, 
but needs to be targeted and provide stakeholders with clear incentives to work towards 
solutions.  Appendix: Variables in the Analytical Framework 
 
The analytical framework used for this research project entails several variables 
hypothesized to be related to the success or failure of river basin management 
institutions, grouped into four categories. 
•  Contextual factors and initial conditions—The literature on decentralized water 
resource management indicates that successful decentralization is at least partly a 
function of the initial conditions that prevail at the time a decentralization 
initiative is attempted.  These initial conditions are elements of the social context 
of the decentralization effort.  They include 
  Economic development of the nation; 
  Economic development of the basin area; 
  Initial distribution of resources among basin stakeholders; and 
  Class, religious, or other social/cultural distinctions among basin 
stakeholders. 
 
•  Characteristics of the decentralization process—In countries that have attempted 
to decentralize water resource management to the basin level, characteristics of 
the decentralization process itself will affect the prospects for successful 
implementation.  Two necessary conditions of a decentralization initiative are (a) 
devolution of authority and responsibility from the center, and (b) acceptance of 
that authority and responsibility by the local or regional units.  Whether (a) and 
(b) occur will depend in part upon why and how the decentralization takes place.  
Important factors include 
  Whether basin-level management was a local initiative to assume 
management responsibilities, a devolution that was mutually 
desired by local stakeholders and central government officials, or a 
decision by central government officials to shed water resource 
management responsibilities regardless of whether basin 
stakeholders wanted to assume them; 
  The extent of central-government recognition of local-level basin 
governance; and, 
  Whether central government officials maintained a policy 
commitment to decentralization and basin management through 
transitions in central government administration. 
•  Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities—
Because successful decentralization requires complementary actions at the central 
government and local levels, other aspects of the central-local relationship can be 
expected to condition that success.  Political and institutional variables should be  
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explored that relate to the respective capacities of the central government and the 
basin-level stakeholders, and the relationship between them.  Key factors include 
  The extent to which devolution of water management 
responsibilities from central government to basin institutions has 
been real or merely rhetorical, and whether devolution has been 
handled as a supportive transition to basin management or as an 
abrupt abandonment of central government authority; 
  The financial resources available to basin-level institutions, and the 
extent of their financial autonomy; 
  Basin management participants’ ability to create and modify 
institutional arrangements that are tailored to their needs and 
circumstances; 
  The extent of other experience at the local or regional level within 
the country with self-governance and service provision; 
  The distribution (particularly asymmetries) of national-level 
political influence among basin stakeholders; 
  Characteristics of the water rights system in the country which 
facilitate or hinder basin management efforts; and 
  Whether basin-level institutions have had adequate time for 
implementation and adaptation of basin management activities. 
•  The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements—Successful 
implementation of decentralized water resource management will also depend on 
features of the basin-level arrangements created by stakeholders and/or central 
government officials.  Important ones include 
  The presence of basin-level governance institutions; 
  The extent of clarity of institutional boundaries, and their match 
with basin boundaries; 
  Whether and to what extent basin-level institutional arrangements 
recognize sub-watershed communities of interest; 
  The availability of forums for information sharing and 
communication among basin stakeholders; 
  The ability to make, monitor, and enforce contingent contracts 
whereby basin stakeholders can agree to contribute to 
improvements in basin conditions; 
  The institutionalization of regular monitoring of basin conditions 
by means that are trusted by water users; and 
  The availability of forums for conflict resolution. 
Certainly, these factors will not all apply with equal significance in all cases.  In 
each case, the emergence and path of river basin management will be affected profoundly  
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by some of these variables, affected slightly by others, and not at all by some.   
Institutional analysis in a case-study setting consists largely in determining which 
institutional factors in what combination appear to have been linked to outcomes.   
Furthermore, many of the variables listed above have subjective components, and will be 
assessed differently by different participants and observers.  It is therefore essential in 
these case studies that team members interview individuals with a variety of perspectives.  
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Terms and Abbreviations 
Balai PSDA  Basin Water Resource Management Units 
BAPEDALDA Provincial  Environmental Impact Control Agency 
BAPPENAS  National Planning Agency 
BUMD  Regional Government-Owned Enterprises 
BUMN State-Owned  Enterprises 
Dinas PUP  Provincial Water Resources Service Agency 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
IMT  Irrigation Management Transfer 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
Kabupaten Rural  Districts 
Kotamadya  Urban districts, or municipalities 
MPW  Ministry of Public Works 
MoF  Ministry of Finance 
O&M Operations  and  Maintenance 
PDAM  Domestic Water Supply Company 
PJT I  Brantas River Basin Corporation 
PLN  State Electric Company 
PPTPA  Basin Water Resources Committee 
PTPA  Provincial Water Resources Committee 
WATSAL  Water Resources Sector Adjustment Loan 
WUA Water  User  Association 
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